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INTRODUCTION 
The international intellectual property system is on the brink of a 
deepening crisis.  Government officials, civil society groups, and 
private parties are staking out opposing positions on a variety of issues 
in an increasingly wide array of international venues.  The issues range 
from patented medicine to biodiversity and traditional knowledge, and 
from digital content and webcasting to the harmonization of 
procedural rules.  The results are increasingly dysfunctional:  
acrimonious and unresolved clashes over substantive rules and values, 
competition among international institutions for policy dominance, 
and a proliferation of fragmented and incoherent treaty obligations 
and nonbinding norms. 
This ominous state of affairs has evolved fairly rapidly.  The last 
decade has seen a dramatic expansion of intellectual property 
protection standards, both in their subject matter and in the scope of 
the economic interests they protect.  Advances in technology have 
engendered demands for new forms of legal protection by businesses 
and content owners.  And with the adoption of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”),1 
nation states linked intellectual property rights to the world trading 
system, creating new and robust enforcement opportunities at the 
international and national levels.  These interrelated developments 
have made intellectual property rights relevant to a broad range of 
value-laden economic, social, and political issues with important 
human rights implications, including public health, education, food 
and agriculture, privacy, and free expression.2 
A recent wave of resistance to this rapid expansion of intellectual 
property rights has brought the work of the World Trade Organization 
 
 1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments — Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPS]. 
 2 For earlier analyses of these trends, see Peter Drahos, THE UNIVERSALITY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 19-23 (1998), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/hr/paneldiscussion/papers/pdf/drahos.pdf (documenting 
proceedings of panel discussion held by World Intellectual Property Organization in 
collaboration with Office of U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights); Laurence R. 
Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property:  Conflict or Coexistence?, 22 NETH. Q. 
HUM. RTS. 167, 171-75 (2004) [hereinafter Helfer, Conflict or Coexistence]; Laurence R. 
Helfer, Regime Shifting:  The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 26-45 (2004) [hereinafter Helfer, 
Regime Shifting]. 
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(“WTO”) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) 
— the two most prominent international intellectual property 
lawmaking venues — to a virtual standstill.  In the WTO, issues 
relating to compulsory licenses for patented pharmaceuticals; the 
relationship among biodiversity, patents, and plant breeders’ rights; 
and the protection of geographical indications have remained 
unresolved for nearly four years.3  Negotiations in WIPO are faring 
little better.  Industrialized nations are pressing for new treaties 
relating to substantive patent rules, audiovisual works, and 
broadcasters’ rights.  Developing countries and consumer groups have 
countered with a “development agenda” that calls for a moratorium on 
new treaty-making and instead demands that WIPO give greater 
attention to public access to knowledge and to non-proprietary 
systems of creativity and innovation.  These conflicting forces have 
essentially neutralized each other.  Each side has blocked or delayed 
its opponents’ proposals as debates over new rules and policies have 
become increasingly contentious and mired in procedural formalism.4 
With forward motion in the WTO and WIPO effectively stalled, 
both proponents and opponents of intellectual property rights have 
sought out greener pastures.  Developing countries and their like-
minded nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) allies have decamped 
to more sympathetic multilateral venues — most notably the World 
Health Organization (“WHO”), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization, and the conferences of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity — where they have found more fertile soil in which to grow 
proposals that seek to roll back intellectual property rights or at least 
 
 3 See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision:  World 
Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317, 324-26 
(2005); Scant Progress in GI Discussions, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Geneva, 
Switz.), Sept. 27, 2005, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-09-
28/WTOinbrief.htm#2; TRIPS Council Meeting Suspended in Effort to Meet Public Health 
Deadline, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Geneva, Switz.), Mar. 16, 2005, available 
at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-03-16/story1.htm. 
 4 See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, WIPO Members Reach Compromise on Advancing Patent 
Law Negotiations, 22 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1622 (Oct. 13, 2005) (“The United States 
and a group of mainly developed countries have been at loggerheads since May 2003 . 
. . over the future direction and scope of negotiations on WIPO’s proposed Substantive 
Patent Law Treaty.”); Michael Warnecke, WIPO Fails to Reach Consensus on Including 
Webcasts in Broadcasting Treaty, 70 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 599 (Sept. 
30, 2005) (describing disputes over proposed broadcasting treaty). 
For some commentators, this deadlock is a salutary result.  See Keith E. Maskus & 
Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the 
Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 312-13 (2004) (calling for 
moratorium on additional international intellectual property lawmaking). 
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eschew further expansions of the monopoly privileges they confer.  
Developed countries and intellectual property owners, too, are leaving 
the field, not for other multilateral organizations but for bilateral and 
regional trade and investment treaties.  The price these countries 
demand for expanded market access and foreign investment is 
adherence to intellectual property rules that equal or exceed those 
found even in the most protective multilateral agreements.5 
In this maelstrom of reaction, resistance, and regime shifting, 
international human rights law is poised to become an increasingly 
central subject of contestation.  For more than a century, international 
agreements have protected certain moral and material interests of 
authors, inventors, and other intellectual property creators.  Until very 
recently, however, the conceptualization of these intellectual property 
interests as internationally protected human rights was all but 
unexplored.  Intellectual property has remained a normative 
backwater in the burgeoning post-World War II human rights 
movement, neglected by international tribunals, governments, and 
legal scholars while other rights emerged from the jurisprudential 
shadows.6 
What little can be discerned about the intellectual property 
provisions of human rights law reveals a concern for balance.  Both the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR” or “the Covenant”) recognize the moral and material 
interests of authors and inventors7 and the right “to enjoy the arts and 
 
 5 See Brian Knowlton, U.S. Plays It Tough on Copyright Rules, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
Oct. 4, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/03/business/ 
iprtrade.php (“So determined is the United States to strengthen copyright and patent 
protection that it is, in effect, exporting its own standards through free trade 
agreements reached with countries or regions as diverse as Australia, Singapore and 
Central America.”); see also Concerns Raised Over Access to Medicines Under Trade 
Treaties, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Geneva, Switz.), Jul. 14, 2004, available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-07-14/story3.htm; GRAIN, BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
IMPOSING TRIPS-PLUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ON BIODIVERSITY IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (2005), http://www.grain.org/rights_files/TRIPS-plus%20table_September_ 
2005.pdf. 
 6 Recently, a few commentators have started to explore in detail specific facets of 
the intersection between intellectual property law and human rights law, such as the 
relationship between copyright and freedom of expression.  See generally, COPYRIGHT 
AND FREE SPEECH:  COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES (Jonathan Griffiths & 
Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005); COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS:  FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
— INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY — PRIVACY (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2004) [hereinafter 
COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
 7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 27, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. 
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to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.”8  These clauses 
offer protection to creators and innovators and the fruits of their 
intellectual endeavors.  But they also recognize the public’s right to 
benefit from the scientific and cultural progress that intellectual 
property products can engender. 
Without elaboration, however, these textual provisions provide only 
a faint outline of how to develop human rights-compliant mechanisms 
to promote creativity and innovation.  They also invite governments 
and activists on both sides of the intellectual property divide to use the 
rhetoric of human rights to bolster arguments for or against revising 
intellectual property protection standards in treaties and in national 
laws.9  Without greater normative clarity, however, such “rights talk”10 
risks creating a legal environment in which every claim (and therefore 
no claim) enjoys the distinctive protections that attach to human 
rights.11 
The skeletal and under-theorized intellectual property provisions of 
human rights law also leave critical questions unanswered.  What, for 
 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights arts. 15(1)(b), (c), 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 [hereinafter ICESCR] (recognizing right “to benefit 
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which he is the author” and to “to enjoy the benefits 
of scientific progress and its applications”). 
 8 UDHR, supra note 7, art. 27(1). 
 9 See, e.g., Tom Giovanetti & Merrill Matthews, Institute for Policy Innovation, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, IDEAS, Sept. 2005, at 2, 2), available at 
http://www.ipi.org (asserting that “IP protection has long been recognized as a basic 
human right” and that those who “want to weaken IP protections” are advocating 
“expropriation of others’ property” and engaging in “ironically, one of the most ‘anti-
human rights’ actions governments could take”); Third World Network, Statement at 
the Third Intersessional Intergovernmental Meeting (July 22, 2005), 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/a2k/2005-July/000539.html (challenging assertion 
that “IP rights have been recognized at human rights” as “a misreading of the existing 
international conventions,” and that [t]he [ICESCR recognizes] rewarding intellectual 
contribution but does not specifically mention ‘IP rights’”); see also Letter from Shari 
Steele, Staff Attorney, Electronic Freedom Foundation, to WIPO Internet Domain 
Name Process (Nov. 6, 1998), available at http://www.eff.org/Infrastructure/ 
DNS_control/19981106_eff_wipo_dns.comments (“We believe that the provision of 
Internet domain names is fundamentally a human rights issue, not an intellectual 
property issue.”). 
 10 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:  THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 14 (1991). 
 11 See, e.g., Philip Alston, Conjuring up New Human Rights:  A Proposal for Quality 
Control, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 607 (1984); John H. Knox, Beyond Human Rights:  
Developing Private Duties Under Public International Law 17 (Sept. 1, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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example, is the relationship between the intellectual property clauses 
of the UDHR and ICESCR and the remaining civil, political, social, 
and economic rights enshrined in human rights pantheon?  And how 
do human rights law’s intellectual property rules interface with the 
rules set out in multilateral agreements emanating from WIPO, the 
WTO, and regional and bilateral trade and investment treaties? 
These uncertainties — together with the deepening crisis facing the 
international intellectual property system — highlight the need to 
develop a comprehensive and coherent “human rights framework” for 
intellectual property law and policy.  The questions to be answered in 
constructing such a framework are foundational.  They include issues 
as basic as defining the different attributes of the “rights” protected by 
each system; whether relevant standards of conduct are legally binding 
or only aspirational; whether such standards apply to governments 
alone or also to private parties; and adopting rules to resolve 
inconsistencies among overlapping international and national laws 
and policies.  A human rights framework for intellectual property 
must also distinguish situations in which the two legal systems have 
the same or similar objectives (but may employ different rules or 
mechanisms to achieve those objectives), from “true conflicts” of goals 
or values that are far more difficult to reconcile.12  Finally, the 
framework must include an institutional dimension, one that 
considers the diverse international and domestic lawmaking and 
adjudicatory bodies in which states and non-state actors generate new 
rules, norms, and enforcement strategies. 
This Article offers a preliminary foray into these novel and complex 
issues.  Part I begins with a brief overview of the textual and historical 
foundations of the intersections between human rights and intellectual 
property, focusing on the underlying legal and institutional factors 
that have fomented recent conflicts between the two legal regimes.  
Part II describes the genesis of those conflicts in greater detail, 
focusing on the rights of indigenous peoples and traditional 
knowledge and on the U.N. human rights system’s response to TRIPS 
and bilateral and regional intellectual property treaties.  Part III turns 
to an analysis of two documents, recently drafted by the U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which suggest a 
partial and tentative outline of a human rights framework for 
intellectual property.  I use these documents to flesh out the 
 
 12 Cf. BRAINERD CURRIE, Married Women’s Contracts:  A Study in Conflict-of-Laws 
Method, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 77, 107 (1963) (distinguishing 
between false conflicts, which “present no real conflicts problem” and “true conflicts,” 
which “cannot be solved by any science or method of conflict of laws”). 
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framework in greater detail and offer a preliminary approach for 
mediating the two fields of law and policy.  Part IV analyzes the 
rapidly changing institutional environment in which new actors are 
generating new legal rules relevant to the human rights-intellectual 
property interface.  I focus in particular on recent treaty-making 
initiatives in the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (“UNESCO”), WHO, and WIPO, each of which uses 
international human rights law in different ways to challenge existing 
approaches to intellectual property protection and to revise the 
mandates of intergovernmental organizations. 
I. THE TEXTUAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A HUMAN RIGHTS 
FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
If asked to identify the freedoms and liberties protected as human 
rights, even the most knowledgeable observers would be unlikely to 
list the right of authors and inventors to protect the fruits of their 
intellectual efforts.  Yet such rights were recognized at the birth of the 
international human rights movement.  No less an august statement of 
principles than the UDHR provides that “everyone has the right to the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the 
author.”13  The UDHR’s drafting history makes clear that the 
protection of authors’ rights was no accident, even if the drafters’ 
precise intentions remain elusive.14  Support for these rights also finds 
 
 13 UDHR, supra note 7, art. 27(2). 
 14 JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  ORIGINS, 
DRAFTING AND INTENT 220-21 (1999).  As one scholar recently observed, although the 
motivations of governments who favored inclusion of article 27 in the UDHR are 
somewhat obscure, the proponents appear to have been divided into two camps: 
What we know is that the initial strong criticism that intellectual property 
was not properly speaking a Human Right or that it already attracted 
sufficient protection under the regime of protection afforded to property 
rights in general was eventually defeated by a coalition of those who 
primarily voted in favour because they felt that the moral rights deserved 
and needed protection and met the Human Rights standard and those who 
felt the ongoing internationalization of copyright needed a boost and that 
this could be a tool in this respect. 
Paul Torremans, Copyright as a Human Right, in COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra 
note 6, at 6.  The intentions of the drafters of the analogous provisions of the ICESCR 
seem equally obscure.  See Maria Green, Int’l Anti-Poverty L. Ctr., Drafting History of 
the Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant, ¶¶ 41-43, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/15 
(Oct. 9, 2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/ 
872a8f7775c9823cc1256999005c3088?Opendocument (demonstrating that debates 
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expression in nearly identical language in the ICESCR, an 
international convention adopted nearly twenty years later that makes 
the UDHR’s economic and social guarantees binding as a matter of 
treaty law.15 
Strikingly, human rights law’s inclusion of the rights of creators and 
inventors has not been reciprocated in the international intellectual 
property system.  No references to “human rights” appear in 
multilateral treaties such as the Paris,16 Berne,17 and Rome18 
Conventions, nor do they appear in the more recently adopted TRIPS 
Agreement.  These treaties repeatedly describe the legal protections for 
authors, inventors and other intellectual property owners as “rights,” 
“private rights,” and “exclusive rights,”19 phrases that may appear to 
suggest a commonality of objectives between the two legal regimes. 
These linguistic and textual parallels are only superficial, however.  
References to rights in intellectual property treaties serve distinctive 
structural and institutional purposes.  They help to demarcate the 
treaties as charters of private rather than public international law,20 
that is, as agreements that authorize individuals and businesses to 
 
over intellectual property provisions of ICESCR focused on Cold War issues, and 
concluding that Covenant’s drafters “did not seem to deeply consider the difficult 
balance between public needs and private rights when it comes to intellectual 
property,” and that “[w]hen the question was raised, they tended to dismiss it almost 
out of hand”). 
 15 ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 15(1); see also Green, supra note 14, ¶¶ 7-46 
(discussing drafting history of article 15(1)(c)). 
 16 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 17 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne 
Convention]. 
 18 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 
[hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
 19 See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 1, pmbl. (“recognizing that intellectual property 
rights are private rights”); Berne Convention, supra note 17, art. 9(1) (“Authors of 
literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall have the exclusive right 
of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any manner or form.”); Paris 
Convention, supra note 16, art. 2 (referring to “the rights specially provided for by 
this Convention”). 
 20 See Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking:  The 
Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 192 (2005) (stating 
that “private international law has traditionally governed relationships and litigation 
between private parties”).  But see Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law 
and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 520-21 (2005) (explaining ways in 
which distinctions between public and private international law are artificial and 
increasingly eroding). 
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claim legal entitlements against other private parties in national courts 
under national laws.21  In addition, use of “rights” language helps to 
bolster claims of intellectual property owners in foreign legal systems 
unfamiliar with or skeptical of the entitlements the treaties create for 
non-nationals.  The principal justifications for references to rights in 
intellectual property agreements are thus grounded not in 
deontological claims about the inherent attributes or needs of human 
beings, but rather arise from efforts to realize the economic and 
instrumental benefits of protecting intellectual property products 
across national borders. 
Although the references to rights in intellectual property law and 
human rights law have distinct theoretical and philosophical roots, the 
recent expansion of the two fields has blurred these distinctions in 
new and unexamined ways.  International relations scholars have 
noted the tendency of international legal regimes to expand their 
scope over time, creating dense “policy spaces” in which formerly 
unrelated sets of principles, norms, and rules increasingly overlap in 
incoherent and inconsistent ways.22  Such regime expansions are 
especially pronounced in international intellectual property law and 
international human rights law. 
Since its inception in the late nineteenth century, the development 
of intellectual property protection rules occurred in a uni-modal 
international regime confined to intellectual property-specific 
diplomatic conferences and conventions.  The focus of treaty-making 
during this formative period was the gradual expansion of protected 
subject matters and exclusive rights through periodic revisions to the 
Berne, Paris, Rome, and other conventions.23  With the advent of 
TRIPS in 1994, the regime entered into a bimodal phrase in which 
rule-making competencies were shared between two 
 
 21 This structural framework also helps to explain the assertion made by 
international intellectual property scholars that there is “no international intellectual 
property law per se; instead intellectual property rights are subject to the principle of 
territoriality” and “vary according to what each state recognizes and enforces.”  
Andrea Morgan, Comment, TRIPS to Thailand:  The Act for the Establishment of and 
Procedure for Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
795, 796 (2000) (collecting authorities). 
 22 See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral 
Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND 
LEGITIMACY:  THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 264, 266 (Roger 
B. Porter et al. eds., 2001). 
 23 See 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBORING RIGHTS:  THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 84-133 (2d ed. 2006). 
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intergovernmental organizations:  WIPO and the WTO.24  By 2005, 
however, the international intellectual property system had morphed 
again, this time into a “conglomerate regime” or a “regime complex” 
— a multi-issue, multi-venue, mega-regime in which governments and 
NGOs shift norm creating initiatives from one venue to another within 
the conglomerate, selecting the forum in which they are most likely to 
achieve their objectives.25 
The international human rights regime has exhibited similar 
expansionist tendencies.  Although the roots of human rights law date 
back to the inter-war years, its full flowering first occurred in the years 
following World War II.  During this gestational period, government 
officials, international bureaucrats, NGOs, and scholars were occupied 
with foundational issues.  Their most pressing goal was to elaborate 
and codify legal norms and enhance international mechanisms for 
monitoring compliance by nation states.  As treaties, institutions, and 
jurisprudence evolved, the regime developed a de facto separation of 
human rights into categories.  These categories ranged from a core set 
of peremptory norms for the most egregious forms of misconduct, to 
civil and political rights, to economic, social, and cultural rights.26 
Economic, social, and cultural rights are the most expansive and, for 
many countries, the most controversial.  Whereas civil and political 
rights are negative liberties that require government officials to refrain 
from particular actions, economic, social, and cultural rights obligate 
governments to provide minimum levels of subsistence and well-being 
to individuals and groups.  Achieving these goals requires affirmative 
measures that often have significant financial consequences and 
require difficult tradeoffs among competing categories of rights 
holders and other claimants.27  These affirmative obligations also 
 
 24 See Agreement Between the World Intellectual Property Organization and the 
World Trade Organization, Dec. 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 754 (1996) (providing for joint 
legal and technical assistance to developing countries and information between both 
organizations). 
 25 See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 2, at 16-17. 
 26 See Helfer, Conflict or Coexistence, supra note 2, at 50-51. 
 27 For thoughtful recent discussions on achieving economic, social, and cultural 
rights, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS:  FDR’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004); Mark Tushnet, Enforcing 
Socio-Economic Rights:  Lessons from South Africa, ESR REVIEW, Sept. 2005, at 2, 2, 
available at http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/Projects/Socio-Economic-Rights/ 
esr-review/esr-previous-editions/esrreviewsept2005.pdf; Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare 
Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review (unpublished paper), available at 
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/seminars/tushnet.pdf.  For an earlier critical 
analysis of economic and social rights, see Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in 
WESTERN RIGHTS?:  POST-COMMUNIST APPLICATION 225 (Andras Sajo ed., 1996). 
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create broad areas of overlap — and of potential conflict — with 
international intellectual property protection rules, as the next section 
explains. 
II. INITIAL CONTESTATIONS OVER HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
Two events catapulted intellectual property issues onto the agenda 
of international human rights norm-creating bodies.  The first was an 
emphasis on the neglected cultural rights of indigenous peoples, and 
the second was the linking of intellectual property and trade through 
TRIPS and, more recently, bilateral and regional “TRIPS-plus” 
treaties.28  These events exposed serious normative deficiencies of 
intellectual property from a human rights perspective, and they 
prompted new standard-setting initiatives which increased the 
contestations between the two regimes. 
A. The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Traditional Knowledge 
Beginning in the early 1990s, the U.N. human rights system began 
to devote significant attention to the rights of indigenous 
communities.29  Among the many claims that these communities 
sought from nation states was the right to recognition of and control 
over their culture, including traditional knowledge relating to 
biodiversity, medicines, and agriculture.  From an intellectual 
property perspective, traditional knowledge was treated as part of the 
public domain, either because it did not meet established subject 
matter criteria for protection, or because the indigenous communities 
 
 28 These treaties are referred to as “TRIPS-plus” because they contain intellectual 
property protection rules more stringent than those found in TRIPS, obligate 
developing countries to implement TRIPS before the end of its specified transition 
periods, or require such countries to accede to or conform to the requirements of 
other multilateral intellectual property agreements.  See Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs:  
Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. L. 791, 794-807 (2002), 
available at www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/papers.htm (describing 
TRIPS-plus bilateral agreements negotiated by United States and E.C. with individual 
developing country governments); GRAIN, “TRIPS-PLUS” THROUGH THE BACK DOOR:  
HOW BILATERAL TREATIES IMPOSE MUCH STRONGER RULES FOR IPRS ON LIFE THAN THE 
WTO (2001) [hereinafter GRAIN, TRIPS-PLUS], available at http://www.grain.org/ 
docs/trips-plus-en.pdf (same); OECD, REGIONALISM AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING 
SYSTEM 111, 111-22 (2003), available at http://www1.oecd.org/publications/ 
e-book/2203031E.PDF (same). 
 29 See Erica-Irene Daes, Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples, 95 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 143, 147 (2001). 
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who created it did not endorse private ownership rules.30  By treating 
this knowledge as effectively un-owned, however, intellectual property 
law made that knowledge available for exploitation by third parties, to 
be used as an upstream input for later downstream innovations that 
were themselves privatized through patents, copyrights, and plant 
breeders’ rights.31  Adding insult to injury, the financial and 
technological benefits of those innovations were rarely shared with 
indigenous communities.32 
U.N. human rights bodies sought to close this hole in the fabric of 
intellectual property law by commissioning a working group and a 
special rapporteur to create a Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples33 and Principles and Guidelines for the Protection 
of the Heritage of Indigenous People.34  These documents adopt a 
 
 30 See Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 238 (2001) (“TK [traditional knowledge] is often (and 
conveniently) assumed to be in the public domain. This is likely to encourage the 
presumption that nobody is harmed and no rules are broken when research 
institutions and corporations use it freely.”). 
 31 See LAURENCE R. HELFER, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PLANT VARIETIES:  INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES AND POLICY 
OPTIONS FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 2-3 (2004). 
 32 See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, SUB-COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, WRITTEN STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY INTERNATIONAL INDIAN TREATY 
COUNCIL 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/2003/NGO/127 (2003): 
The theft and patenting of Indigenous Peoples’ bio-genetic resources is 
facilitated by [TRIPS].  Some of the plants which Indigenous Peoples have 
discovered, cultivated, and used for food, medicine, and for sacred 
ceremonies since time immemorial have already been patented in the United 
States, Japan and Europe.  A few examples of these are ayahuasca, quinoa, 
and sangre de drago in South America; Kava in the Pacific; turmeric and 
bitter melon in Asia. 
There are some exceptions, however, particularly in the form of so-called 
bioprospecting agreements between indigenous groups and entities in the developed 
world.  For a discussion of these agreements, see Charles R. McManis, Intellectual 
Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge Protection:  Thinking Globally, 
Acting Locally (Univ. of Washington Occasional Papers No. 1, 2003). 
 33 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of 
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994). 
 34 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of 
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Draft Principles and Guidelines for the Protection 
of the Heritage of Indigenous People, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26, Annex 1 (June 21, 1995) (initial text draft of Principles and 
Guidelines); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of 
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Report of the Seminar on the Draft Principles and 
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decidedly skeptical approach to intellectual property protection.  On 
the one hand, the documents urge states to protect traditional 
knowledge using legal mechanisms that fit comfortably within existing 
intellectual property paradigms — such as allowing indigenous 
communities to seek injunctions and damages for unauthorized uses.35  
But the documents also define protectable subject matter more broadly 
than existing intellectual property laws, and they urge states to deny 
patents, copyrights, and other exclusive rights over “any element of 
indigenous peoples’ heritage” that does not provide for “sharing of 
ownership, control, use and benefits” with those peoples.36  In short, a 
human rights-inspired analysis of traditional knowledge views 
intellectual property as one of the problems facing indigenous 
communities, and, only perhaps, as part of a solution to those 
problems. 
B. The TRIPS Agreement, “TRIPS-Plus” Treaties, and Human Rights 
The second area of intersection between human rights and 
intellectual property relates to the 1994 TRIPS Agreement and “TRIPS-
plus” treaties.37  TRIPS adopted relatively high minimum standards of 
protection for all WTO members, including many developing and least 
developed countries with little previous interest in protecting patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks.38  In addition, unlike previous intellectual 
property agreements, TRIPS has teeth.  It is linked to the WTO’s 




Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/26 (2000) (revised text of draft Principles and Guidelines).  The 
Sub-Commission later adopted the Revised Draft Principles and Guidelines and 
transmitted them to the Commission for its approval.  U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council 
[ESOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Decision 
2000/107, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/DEC/107/2000/107 (2000). 
 35 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Promotion & Prot. 
Human Rights, Revised Draft Principles and Guidelines, Guidelines § 23(b) [hereinafter 
ESOSOC, Revised Draft] (providing that national laws to protect indigenous peoples’ 
heritage should provide means for indigenous peoples to prevent and obtain damages 
for “the acquisition, documentation or use of their heritage without proper 
authorization of the traditional owners”). 
 36 ESOSOC, Revised Draft, Guidelines § 23(c). 
 37 See TRIPS, supra note 1; GRAIN, TRIPS-PLUS, supra note 28. 
 38 For a review of the changes TRIPS wrought, see J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS 
Agreement Comes of Age:  Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 445-56 (2000). 
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through mandatory adjudication backed up by the threat of retaliatory 
trade sanctions.39 
The U.N. human rights system first turned its attention to TRIPs in 
2000.  In August of that year, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (“Sub-Commission”) 
adopted Resolution 2000/7 on “Intellectual Property Rights and 
Human Rights.”40  The resolution, which was highly critical of 
intellectual property protection, stated that “actual or potential 
conflicts exist between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement 
and the realization of economic, social and cultural rights.”41  These 
conflicts cut across a wide swath of legal terrain, including:  (1) the 
transfer of technology to developing countries; (2) the consequences 
for the right to food of plant breeders’ rights and patents for 
genetically modified organisms; (3) biopiracy;42 (4) the protection of 
the culture of indigenous communities; and (5) the impact on the 
right to health of legal restrictions on access to patented 
pharmaceuticals.43  To resolve these conflicts, the Sub-Commission 
urged national governments, intergovernmental organizations, and 
civil society groups to give human rights “primacy . . . over economic 
policies and agreements.”44 
This assertion of normative predominance had no legal force, 
however, because the Sub-Commission’s resolutions are, by their own 
terms, nonbinding.  Nor did the Sub-Commission parse the texts of 
 
 39 See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 2, at 2. 
 40 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Promotion & Prot. of 
Human Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Res. 2000/7, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Resolution 2000/7], available 
at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/c462b62cf8a07b13c12569700046 
704e?Opendocument.  For a discussion of the Resolution’s history, see generally 
David Weissbrodt & Kell Schoff, A Human Rights Approach to Intellectual Property 
Protection:  The Genesis and Application of Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7, 5 MINN. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2003). 
 41 Resolution 2000/7, supra note 40, pmbl. ¶ 11. 
 42 “Biopiracy” has been loosely used to describe any act by which a commercial 
entity obtains intellectual property rights over biological resources that are seen as 
“belonging” to developing states or indigenous communities located within their 
borders.  See CEAS CONSULTANTS (WYE) LTD., CTR. FOR EUROPEAN AGRIC. STUDIES, 
FINAL REPORT FOR DG TRADE EUR. COMM.:  STUDY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
AGREEMENT ON TRIPS AND BIODIVERSITY RELATED ISSUES 78 (2000). 
 43 Resolution 2000/7, supra note 40, pmbl. ¶ 11; see also id. ¶ 2 (identifying 
conflicts between TRIPS and “the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications, the right to health, the right to food and the right to self-
determination”). 
 44 Id. ¶ 3. 
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the relevant (and binding) international agreements or the rules of 
customary international law to identify which specific human rights 
protections TRIPS violates.  Rather, the Resolution’s principal 
objective was to propose an ambitious new agenda for reviewing 
intellectual property issues within the U.N. human rights system, an 
agenda animated by the basic principle of human rights primacy.45 
In the more than five years since the Resolution’s adoption, the 
response to the Sub-Commission’s invitation has been overwhelming.  
The actions taken and documents produced by U.N. human rights 
bodies are numerous and diverse.  They include:  (1) annual 
resolutions by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights on “Access to 
Medication in the Context of Pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria,” which urge states to ensure such access;46 
(2) an analysis of TRIPS by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, which argues that intellectual property laws must promote 
access to knowledge and innovations, opposes the adoption of TRIPS-
plus treaties, and emphasizes states’ obligations to provide access to 
affordable medicines to treat HIV/AIDS;47 (3) a report by two Special 
Rapporteurs on Globalization, which asserts that intellectual property 
protection has undermined human rights objectives;48 (4) a second 
resolution by the Sub-Commission that identifies a widening set of 
conflicts between TRIPS and human rights, including “the rights to 
self-determination, food, housing, work, health and education, and . . . 
transfers of technology to developing countries”49; (5) an attempt by 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2003/29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/29 
(Apr. 22, 2003); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2001/33, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2001/33 (Apr. 23, 2001); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2002/32, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/32 (Apr. 22, 2002); see also Human Rights Commission Calls on 
States to Use TRIPS Flexibilities, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Geneva, Switz.), 
Apr. 20, 2005, at 5.  The first resolution, sponsored by Brazil in 2001, mandates that 
states, in implementing the right to the highest attainable standard of health, “adopt 
legislation or other measures, in accordance with applicable international law” to 
“safeguard access” to such medications “from any limitations by third parties.”  
Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2001/33, supra, ¶ 3(b). 
 47 The High Commissioner, Report of the High Commisioner on the Impact of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, ¶¶ 
10-15, 27-58, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) [hereinafter High 
Commissioner Report]. 
 48 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and 
Prot. of Human Rights, Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human 
Rights, ¶¶ 19-34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10 (Aug. 2, 2001) (prepared by J. 
Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama) [hereinafter Globalization Report]. 
 49 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on the Prot. and 
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the High Commissioner for Human Rights to seek observer status with 
the WTO and participate in the reviews of TRIPS;50 and (6) a report by 
the U.N. Secretary General on intellectual property and human rights 
based on information submitted by states, intergovernmental 
organizations, and NGOs.51 
Several of these documents contain trenchant critiques of TRIPS, of 
TRIPS-plus treaties, and of expansive intellectual property rights more 
generally.  They also discuss the empirical effects of intellectual 
property agreements on specific human rights, in particular the right 
to health in the context of global pandemics such as HIV/AIDS.52  
With few exceptions, however, these studies fail to provide a detailed 
textual analysis of a human rights framework for intellectual property 
and how that framework interfaces with existing intellectual property 
protection standards in national and international law. 
III. MEDIATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS:  THE INTERPRETIVE APPROACH 
OF THE CESCR COMMITTEE 
This absence of close textual scrutiny in the resolutions and reports 
discussed in the previous sections of this Article is not surprising, 
given that the principal areas of overlap between the two legal regimes 
relate to economic, social, and cultural rights.  Among human rights 
law’s diverse categories, these rights are the least well-developed and 
the least doctrinally prescriptive.  The ICESCR — the principal 
international agreement that protects these rights — is a programmatic 
treaty.53  Its provisions are drafted in gradualist and ambiguous 
language that requires each ratifying state to “take steps . . . to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
 
Promotion of Human Rights, Intellectual Property and Human Rights , Res. 2001/21, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2001/21 (Aug. 16, 2001) (identifying “actual or potential 
conflicts” between human rights obligations and TRIPS, and asserting “need to clarify 
the scope and meaning of several provisions of the TRIPS Agreement”). 
 50 See High Commissioner Report, supra note 47, ¶ 68. 
 51 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12 (June 14, 2001). 
 52 See High Commissioner Report, supra note 47, ¶ 15 (stressing need for TRIPS to 
“be assessed empirically to determine the effects of the Agreement on human rights in 
practice”); Globalization Report, supra note 48, ¶¶ 19-34 (critiquing TRIPS and 
international trade regime more generally). 
 53 See DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:  LAW POLICY AND 
PROCESS 88-93 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining that ICESCR establishes programmatic and 
flexible commitments that are to be achieved over time). 
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progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means.”54 
Only in the last decade have economic, social, and cultural rights 
received sustained jurisprudential attention.  The U.N. Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“the CESCR Committee” or 
“the Committee”) has been the progenitor of a movement to imbue 
these rights with greater prescriptive force.  The Committee is a 
supervisory body of eighteen human rights experts who interpret the 
ICESCR and monitor its implementation by its more than 150 member 
nations.55 
One of the Committee’s principal functions is to provide these 
nations with guidance as to the treaty’s meaning.  This guidance takes 
the form of nonbinding “general comments” on specific treaty articles 
or specific human rights issues.56  General comments serve as focal 
points for change in national legal systems and provide a standard 
against which the Committee can review states’ compliance with the 
Covenant.  Formally, these recommended interpretations are directed 
only to governments.57  But their scope is not limited to public laws or 
the actions of public officials.  They extend as well to individuals, 
business associations, and other private parties whose conduct 
implicates social, economic, and cultural rights.  Although these non-
state actors have no direct human rights responsibilities under the 
Covenant, governments are required to regulate their activities to 
satisfy their own treaty obligations.58 
The CESCR Committee’s first interpretive foray into intellectual 
property occurred in the fall of 2001, when it published a “Statement 
on Human Rights and Intellectual Property.”59  The statement offered 
 
 54 ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 2(1). 
 55 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of 
Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/RatificationStatus.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 
2007). 
 56 See MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS:  A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 89-92 (1995). 
 57 See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 3:  The Nature 
of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424c12563ed 
0052b664?Opendocument.; see also WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 53, at 104-07 
(discussing evolution of Committee’s general comments). 
 58 For a thoughtful and influential analysis of these issues, see generally ANDREW 
CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1993). 
 59 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural 
Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C12/2001/15 (Dec. 14, 2001) 
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a preliminary analysis of the ICESCR’s intellectual property provisions 
and their relationship to other economic and social rights in the 
Covenant.  It also set out a new agenda for the Committee to draft 
general comments on each of the ICESCR’s intellectual property 
clauses.60  In November 2005, the Committee published the first of 
these general comments, an exegesis on article 15(1)(c) of the 
Covenant (“General Comment”), “the right of everyone to benefit 
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the 
author.”61 
Taken together, the Committee’s 2001 statement and the 2005 
general comment on “authors’ rights”62 provide a partial blueprint of a 
human rights framework for intellectual property.  In the sections that 
follow, I review these two documents in detail, expanding upon that 
outline and analyzing its substantive implications. 
A. Introducing a “Violations Approach” to Authors’ Rights 
The Committee’s General Comment reveals the challenges of 
developing a coherent and detailed interpretation of article 15(1)(c) 
from the Covenant’s sparse text.  The draft is a lengthy, densely 
worded, and somewhat repetitive document of fifty-seven paragraphs 
divided into six parts:  (1) an introductory section that explains the 
basic’s premises of the Committee’s analysis; (2) a close textual 
reading of article 15(1)(c)’s “normative content”; (3) a section 
 
[hereinafter Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property], available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/1e1f4514f8512432c1256ba6003b2cc6/$FILE/G01
46641.pdf (follow-up to day of general discussion on article 15.1(c), Monday, 26 
November 2001). 
 60 Id. ¶ 2. 
 61 Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17:  The Right of 
Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from 
Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He Is the Author (Art. 15(1)(c)), 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005 (Nov. 21, 2005) [hereinafter General Comment No. 17], 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/ 
03902145edbbe797c125711500584ea8/$FILE/G0640060.pdf. 
 62 The Anglophone phrases “the rights of authors” and “authors’ rights” are 
confusingly similar to, but legally distinct from, the Francophone “droit d’auteur,” 
which refers to legal rights granted to authors and creators in countries that follow the 
civil law tradition of protection for literary and artistic works.  See generally ALAN 
STROWEL, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT:  DIVERGENCES ET CONVERGENCES (1993) 
(comparing droit d’auteur and copyright).  By contrast, the references to “authors’ 
rights” and similar phrases in this Article describe the legal entitlements for creators 
and inventors that are recognized in international human rights law.  These legal 
protections are not coterminous with those of droit d’auteur. 
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outlining states’ legal obligations, including general, specific, core, and 
related obligations; (4) an analysis of actions or omissions that would 
violate the article; (5) a section on how authors’ rights are to be 
implemented at the national level; and (6) a short discussion of the 
obligations of non-state actors and intergovernmental organizations.63 
This organizational structure, and in particular the distinction it 
creates between “legal obligations” and “violations,” is likely to 
mystify domestic intellectual property lawyers.  The Committee’s 
methodology will, however, be familiar to foreign ministries, human 
rights scholars, and NGOs who have followed the Committee’s past 
efforts to provide concrete interpretations of the ICESCR’s many 
ambiguous clauses.  In particular, the Committee has developed a 
“violations approach” to interpreting the Covenant that distinguishes 
“core obligations” — minimum essential levels of each right which all 
states must immediately implement — from other obligations that 
may be achieved progressively as additional resources become 
available.64  These core obligations include three distinct undertakings 
— to respect, to protect, and to fulfill.  As the Committee explains in 
the General Comment on authors’ rights: 
The obligation to respect requires States parties to refrain from 
interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the 
right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material 
interests of the author.  The obligation to protect requires 
States parties to take measures that prevent third parties from 
interfering with the moral and material interests of authors.  
Finally, the obligation to fulfil requires States to adopt 
appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, 
promotional and other measures towards the full realization of 
article 15, paragraph 1 (c).65 
These three core obligations, although framed in the distinctive 
language of human rights law, should, upon reflection, seem 
reasonably familiar to intellectual property lawyers and scholars.  
Taken seriatim, they bar states from violating authors’ material and 
moral interests themselves, most notably in the form of infringements 
by government agencies or officials;66 they mandate “effective 
 
 63 General Comment No. 17, supra note 61. 
 64 Id. ¶ 10; see also Audrey Chapman, Conceptualizing the Right to Health:  A 
Violations Approach, 65 TENN. L. REV. 389, 395 (1998). 
 65 General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 28; see also id. ¶¶ 44-46 (discussing 
actions and omissions that violate these three obligations). 
 66 Id. ¶¶ 30, 44. 
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protection” of those interests in legislation, including protection of 
“works which are easily accessible or reproducible through modern 
communication and reproduction technologies”;67 and they require 
states to provide judicial and administrative remedies for authors to 
prevent unauthorized uses of their works (i.e., injunctions) and to 
recover compensation for such uses (i.e., damages), and, more 
broadly, to facilitate authors’ participation in and control over 
decisions that affect their moral and material interests.68 
These obligations also overlap with several provisions in intellectual 
property treaties, most notably the Berne Convention’s reproduction 
rights and moral rights clauses, the “making available” right in the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty, and the enforcement provisions in TRIPS.69  These 
commonalities suggest that states can satisfy their obligations under 
article 15(1)(c), at least in part, by ratifying international intellectual 
property agreements and by enacting national copyright and 
neighboring rights laws.  The ICESCR’s state reporting procedures 
strongly support this claim.70  Since the early 1990s, member nations 
have regularly cited to such treaties and laws to demonstrate 
compliance with the authors’ rights provisions in the Covenant.71 
 
 67 Id. ¶¶ 31, 45. 
 68 See id. ¶¶ 34, 46. 
 69 Berne Convention, supra note 17, arts. 6bis, 9; WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 8, 
Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (entered into force Mar. 6, 
2002) [hereinafter WTC], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/pdf/ 
trtdocs_wo033.pdf; WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty art. 10, Dec. 20, 
1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (entered into force May 20, 2002), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/pdf/trtdocs_wo034.pdf; TRIPS, 
supra note 1, arts. 41-51, 61. 
 70 ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 16 (requiring states to submit periodic “reports on 
the measures they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of 
the rights recognized” in Covenant). 
 71 See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & 
Cultural Rights, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Second Periodic Report:  Jordan, ¶ 151, U.N. Doc. E/1990/6/Add.17, 
(July 23, 1998), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/ 
7eb0986e8af3f29c802567240056ca4c?Opendocument (citing amendments to 
Copyright Protection Act that conform to international copyright treaties and 
government’s intent to ratify such treaties to demonstrate compliance with article 
15(1)(c)); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural 
Rights, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Initial Report:  Israel, ¶¶ 782-88, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.39(3), (Jan. 20, 
1998), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/ 
41e674c4a2affbd480256617004768f5?Opendocument (discussing evolution and 
expansion of copyright legislation and ratification of numerous international 
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Notwithstanding the commonalities between the human rights and 
intellectual property regimes, the Committee’s “core obligations” 
approach to authors’ rights leaves many issues unresolved.  Most 
notably, it does not define the content of the “moral and materials 
interests” which states are required to “respect, protect, and fulfill.”72  
Nor does it specify whether — and, if so, how — a human rights 
framework for authors’ rights differs from the legal rules contained in 
intellectual property treaties and domestic legislation.  The next 
section considers the Committee’s treatment of these key definitional 
issues. 
B. Developing a Distinctive Human Rights Framework 
for Authors’ Rights 
The General Comment gives detailed attention to the differences 
between authors’ moral and material interests and the provisions of 
intellectual property treaties and statutes.  The Committee begins with 
the basic and uncontroversial assertion that the “scope of protection” 
of authors’ rights in article 15(1)(c) “does not necessarily coincide 
with what is termed intellectual property rights under national 
legislation or international agreements.”73  But what, precisely, are 
these differences in scope? 
The Committee first compares foundational principles.  It notes that 
“[h]uman rights are fundamental as they are inherent to the human 
person as such, whereas intellectual property rights are first and 
foremost means by which States seek to provide incentives for 
inventiveness and creativity . . . for the benefit of society as a whole.”74  
Because intellectual property rights are granted by the state, they may 
also be taken away by the state.  They are temporary, not permanent; 
they may be “revoked, licensed or assigned”;75 and they may be 
 
agreements to demonstrate compliance with article 15(1)(c)); U.N. Econ. & Soc. 
Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Third Periodic Report:  
Cyprus, ¶ 420, U.N. Doc. E/1994/104/Add.12 (June 6, 1996), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.1994.104.Add.12.En?Opendocument 
(citing ratification of Berne Convention and domestic copyright legislation to 
demonstrate compliance with article 15(1)(c)). 
 72 General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 28. 
 73 Id. ¶ 2; see also id. ¶ 3 (“It is . . . important not to equate intellectual property 
rights with the human right recognized in article 15, paragraph 1(c).”). 
 74 Id. ¶ 1. 
 75 Id. ¶ 2. 
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“traded, amended and even forfeited,”76 commensurate with the 
regulation of a “social product [that] has a social function.”77  By 
contrast, human rights are enduring, “fundamental, inalienable and 
universal entitlements.”78  These statements reflect a vision of authors’ 
rights as human rights that exist independently of the vagaries of state 
approval, recognition, or regulation. 
The Committee identifies several distinctive features of authors’ 
rights in the Covenant.  For example, article 15(1)(c) applies only to 
“individuals, and under certain circumstances groups of individuals 
and communities.”79  Corporations and other legal entities are 
expressly excluded.80  This represents a profound departure from 
Anglo American copyright laws, which have long recognized that legal 
entities can enjoy the status of authors of intellectual property 
products, for example, of works made for hire.81 
Moreover, the protections provided to these natural persons have a 
distinctive human rights flavor.  Consider the issue of equality.  A 
cornerstone of intellectual property treaties is the “national treatment” 
of foreign authors and rights owners.82  A human rights framework for 
authors’ rights encompasses a rule of equality between domestic and 
foreign owners of intellectual property products.  But it goes much 
further, including many additional prohibited grounds of 
discrimination and mandating equal access to legal remedies for 
infringement, including access for “disadvantaged and marginalized 
groups.”83  Equality also has a process dimension, which requires 
 
 76 Id. 
 77 Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, supra note 59, ¶ 4. 
 78 Id. ¶ 6. 
 79 General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 1. 
 80 See id. ¶ 7 (stating that drafters of ICESCR article 15 “considered authors of 
scientific, literary or artistic productions to be natural persons”); Statement on Human 
Rights and Intellectual Property, supra note 59, ¶ 6 (contrasting human rights 
approach to authors’ rights with that of intellectual property regimes which “are 
increasingly focused on protecting business and corporate interests and investments”). 
 81 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the 
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author . . 
. and . . . owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”). 
 82 See, e.g., SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS:  1886-1986, at 17-38 (1987); David Vaver, The National 
Treatment Requirements of the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions, 17 INT’L REV. 
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 577 (1986). 
 83 General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 39(d); see also Statement on Human 
Rights and Intellectual Property, supra note 59, ¶ 7 (stating that “human rights 
instruments place great emphasis on protection against discrimination,” and that 
rights guaranteed in Covenant “must be exercised without discrimination of any kind 
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states to provide authors with information “on the structure and 
functioning of . . . legal or policy regime[s],” and to facilitate their 
participation in “any significant decision-making processes with an 
impact on their rights and legitimate interests,” either directly or 
through “professional associations.”84 
These distinctive features of a human rights conception of authors’ 
rights have some surprising consequences.  If the moral and material 
interests of authors and creators are fundamental rights, then the 
ability of governments to regulate them — either to protect other 
human rights or to achieve other social objectives — ought to be 
exceedingly narrow.  And in fact, the Committee has developed a 
stringent test for assessing the legality of state restrictions on social 
and economic rights,85 a standard that it reaffirms in the General 
Comment on article 15(1)(c). 
According to this test, government restrictions on authors’ rights 
must be “[1] determined by law, [2] in a manner compatible with the 
nature of these rights, [3] must pursue a legitimate aim, and [4] must 
be strictly necessary for the promotion of the general welfare in a 
democratic society.”86  In addition, such limitations must “be [5] 
proportionate, meaning that [6] the least restrictive measures must be 
adopted when several types of limitations may be imposed.”87  This 
multipart test is an intellectual property owner’s dream.  And it is far 
more constraining than the now ubiquitous “three-step test”88 used to 
 
as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status”). 
 84 General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶¶ 18(b), 34.  For an analysis of the 
General Comment’s implications for government regulation of collective rights 
organizations, see Laurence R. Helfer, Collective Management of Copyright and Human 
Rights:  An Uneasy Alliance, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED 
RIGHTS 85 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2006). 
 85 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No. 14:  The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health 
(Art. 12), ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, (Nov. 8, 2000), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.2000.4.En?OpenDocument 
(discussing government’s burden to demonstrate legality of limitations on right to 
health). 
 86 General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 22 (bracketed numbers added). 
 87 Id. ¶ 23 (bracketed numbers added). 
 88 See, e.g., WCT, supra note 69, art. 10(1) (“Contracting Parties may, in their 
national legislation, provide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to 
authors of literary and artistic works under this Treaty in certain special cases that do 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the author.”); TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 13 (“Members shall 
confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice 
  
2007] Toward a Human Rights Framework 995 
assess the treaty-compatibility of exceptions and limitations in 
national copyright and patent laws.89 
Yet if restrictions on authors’ rights are to be so rigidly scrutinized 
(and, presumably, so rarely upheld) how, then, are governments to 
strike a balance between authors’ rights on the one hand and the 
public’s interest in access to knowledge on the other?90  A close 
parsing of the text offers hints of how the Committee may ultimately 
construct a distinctive human rights framework for intellectual 
property when it drafts general comments interpreting the remaining 
rights protected by article 15, which include the right to take part in 
cultural life, the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications, and the freedom indispensable for scientific research and 
creative activity.91 
The key to understanding this framework is to identify the purposes 
of recognizing authors’ moral and material interests as human rights.  
According to the Committee, such rights serve two essential functions.  
First, they “safeguard[] the personal link between authors and their 
creations and between peoples, communities, or other groups and 
their collective cultural heritage.”92  And second, they protect “basic 
 
the legitimate interests of the right holder.”); id. art. 30 (“Members may provide 
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such 
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking 
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”). 
 89 See generally Mihaly Ficsor, How Much of What?:  The “Three-Step Test” and Its 
Application in Two Recent WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, 192 REVUE INTERNATIONALE 
DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 110 (2002); Jane Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law?  
The WTO Panel Decision and the “Three-Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions, 187 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3 (2001). 
 90 The CESCR Committee emphasizes the need for balancing throughout the 
General Comment and in its 2001 Statement.  See, e.g., General Comment No. 17, supra 
note 61, ¶ 22 (“The right to the protection of the moral and materials interests 
resulting from one’s scientific, literary and artistic productions is subject to limitations 
and must be balanced with the other rights recognized in the Covenant . . . .”); id. ¶ 
35 (“States parties are . . . obliged to strike an adequate balance between their 
obligations under article 15, paragraph 1(c), on one hand, and under the other 
provisions of the Covenant, on the other hand, with a view to promoting and 
protecting the full range of rights guaranteed in the Covenant.”); Statement on Human 
Rights and Intellectual Property, supra note 59, ¶ 4 (“Intellectual property rights must 
be balanced with the right to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress and its applications”) (footnote omitted); id. ¶ 17 (“Article 15 of the 
Covenant sets out the need to balance the protection of public and private interests in 
knowledge.”). 
 91 General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 4. 
 92 Id. ¶ 2.  This “personal link” is protected by legislation that enables authors to 
“be recognized as the creators of their scientific, literary and artistic productions and 
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material interests which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an 
adequate standard of living.”93 
These two statements, which recur throughout the General 
Comment,94 suggest the existence of an irreducible core of rights — a 
zone of personal autonomy in which authors can achieve their creative 
potential, control their productive output, and lead independent, 
intellectual lives, all of which are essential requisites for any free 
society.95  Legal protections in excess of those needed to establish this 
core zone of autonomy may serve other salutary social purposes.  But 
those additional protections are not required under article 15 of the 
Covenant and, as a result, they are not subject to the restrictive test 
quoted above. 
Stated differently, once a country guarantees authors and creators 
these two core rights — one moral, the other material — any 
additional intellectual property protections the country provides “must 
be balanced with the other rights recognized in the Covenant,” and 
must give “due consideration” to “the public interest in enjoying 
broad access to” authors’ productions.96  The ICESCR thus gives each 
of its member states the discretion to eschew these additional 
protections altogether or, alternatively, to shape them to the particular 
economic, social, and cultural conditions within their borders.97 
 
 
to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory 
action in relation to their productions which would be prejudicial to their honour or 
reputation.”  Id. ¶ 40(b).  The Committee’s language closely tracks the moral rights 
provisions in article 6bis of the Berne Convention and in many national laws. 
 93 Id. ¶ 2. 
 94 The Committee repeats variants of the “personal link” language a total of six 
times, and it reasserts the “adequate standard of living” formulation no less than nine 
times — repetitions that suggest the importance of these concepts to its analysis.  See 
id. ¶¶  2, 12, 15, 23, 30, 39 (personal link or similar language); id. ¶¶ 2, 4, 15, 16, 23, 
30, 39, 44, 45 (adequate standard of living). 
 95 Cf. COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 5 (stating that drafters of 
UDHR believed that best way to avoid recurrence of abuses of science, technology, 
and copyrighted propaganda that occurred during World War II would be “to 
recognize that everyone had a share in the benefits and that . . . those who made 
valuable [intellectual] contributions were entitled to protection”). 
 96 General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶¶ 22, 35; see also id. ¶ 11 (stating that 
nothing in article 15.1(c) prevents states parties from “adopting higher protection 
standards” in intellectual property treaties or national laws, “provided that these 
standards do not unjustifiably limit the enjoyment by others of their Covenant 
rights”). 
 97 See id. ¶ 18 (stating that “the precise application” of authors’ and inventors’ 
moral and material interests “will depend on the economic, social and cultural 
conditions prevailing in a particular State party”). 
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A human rights framework for authors’ rights is thus both more 
protective and less protective than the approach endorsed by 
copyright and neighboring rights regimes.  It is more protective in that 
rights within the core zone of autonomy are subject to a far more 
stringent limitations test than the one applicable contained in 
intellectual property treaties and national laws.  It is also less 
protective, however, in that a state need not recognize any authors’ 
rights lying outside of this zone or, if it does recognize such additional 
rights, it must give appropriate weight to other social, economic, and 
cultural rights and to the public’s interest in access to knowledge. 
C. First Steps Toward a Balanced Regime of 
Intellectual Property Protection 
The Committee’s General Comment on article 15(1)(c) — which 
focuses only the sub-paragraph of article 15 that protects the rights of 
creators and inventors — offers few details of how states are to achieve 
balanced, human rights-compliant rules of intellectual property 
protection.  Its most informative statement appears in a single 
paragraph of the General Comment — paragraph 35 — which, as 
described below, sets forth an interpretive principle and three specific 
recommendations.98 
The interpretive principle requires states to ensure that “legal and 
other regimes” for the protection of intellectual property “constitute 
no impediment to their ability to comply with their core obligations in 
relation to the right to food, health, education culture, as well as the 
right to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications or any other right set out in the 
Covenant.”99  On the one hand, this statement is simply an innocuous 
reminder that states must reconcile all of their treaty commitments 
and avoid derogating from one set of treaty rules when satisfying 
another.  But the reference to compliance with the ICESCR’s “core 
obligations” masks a deeper structural understanding of how the 
Committee believes governments should reconcile human rights and 
intellectual property. 
First, such a reference acknowledges, albeit indirectly, that states 
may have difficulty reconciling treaty-based intellectual property 
protection rules with the Covenant’s non-core obligations.  These non-
core obligations include the more expansive aspects of economic, 
social, and cultural rights that go beyond the Covenant’s “minimum 
 
 98 Id. ¶ 35. 
 99 Id. 
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essential levels” of protection100 and that states may permissibly 
recognize over time as constrained by their limited resources.  This 
suggests that governments retain — at least in the near term — a fairly 
broad “margin of appreciation”101 within which to reconcile human 
rights guarantees, intellectual property protection rules, and other 
policy objectives, and that the calibrations needed to achieve such 
reconciliation may permissibly vary from one country to another.102 
Second, by referencing “core obligations” — a phrase that appears 
nowhere in the text of the ICESCR and is instead a product of the 
Committee’s own general comment jurisprudence — the Committee 
has arrogated to itself the power to determine which rights are “core” 
and thus could be violated by a government’s adoption of expansive 
intellectual property rules.103  The Committee has thus linked 
violations of the ICESCR to an evolving legal standard that its 
members will develop in future general comments identifying the core 
aspects of specific Covenant rights, including the public’s right “to 
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.”104 
In the interim, however, the Committee offers three specific 
prescriptions for member states.  First, it opines that states “have a 
duty to prevent . . . unreasonably high costs for access to essential 
medicines, plant seeds or other means or food production, or to 
schoolbooks and learning materials, [from] undermin[ing] the rights 
 
 100 Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, supra note 59, ¶ 12. 
 101 The term “margin of appreciation” refers to a doctrine of judicial deference 
developed by the European Court of Human Rights.  It describes “the degree of 
discretion that [a human rights tribunal] is willing to grant national decision makers 
who seek to fulfill their . . . obligations under [a human rights] treaty.”  Laurence R. 
Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement:  The Case for a 
European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357, 404 (1998).  The doctrine 
provides states with “a modicum of breathing room in balancing the protection of 
[specific human rights] against other pressing societal concerns.”  Id.  See generally 
HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS 
OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996) (analyzing doctrine’s origins and 
operations). 
 102 See General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 47 (noting “considerable margin 
of discretion” that each state possesses to determine “which measures are most 
suitable to meet its specific needs,” and stating that these measures “will vary 
significantly from one State to another”). 
 103 Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, supra note 59, ¶ 12 
(explaining that “the Committee has begun to identify the core obligations arising from 
the ‘minimum essential levels in relation to the rights to health, food and education’”) 
(emphasis added). 
 104 ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 15(1)(b). 
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of large segments of the population to health, food and education.”105  
Second, it recommends that states “prevent the use of scientific and 
technical progress for purposes contrary to human rights and dignity, 
including the rights to life, health, and privacy,” for example “by 
excluding inventions from patentability whenever their 
commercialization would jeopardize the full realization of these 
rights,” and by “consider[ing] to what extent the patenting of the 
human body and its parts would affect their obligations under the 
Covenant.”106  Finally, it urges states to “consider undertaking human 
rights impact assessments prior to the adoption and after a period of 
implementation of legislation for the protection of” authors’ rights.107 
These detailed recommendations have uncertain consequences for 
states that have ratified TRIPS and other intellectual property treaties.  
Inasmuch as general comments are only nonbinding interpretations of 
the ICESCR, governments could reasonably interpret the Committee’s 
prescriptions as nothing more than aspirational goals.  And, indeed, 
the recommendations in paragraph 35 are formulated merely as 
suggestions for governments to consider. 
Even in this hortatory form, however, these recommendations may 
produce meaningful legal and political change.108  For example, they 
create opportunities for the Committee, aided by information provided 
by sympathetic NGOs, to question officials about license fees and 
 
 105 General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 35. 
 106 Id. ¶ 35.  It bears noting that TRIPS already permits member states to exclude 
from patentability “animals other than micro-organisms.”  TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 
27(3)(b). 
 107 General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 35.  An earlier draft of the general 
comment included a provision recommending states “to include human rights criteria 
among the requirements for the grant of patents or other intellectual property rights.”  
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Draft General Comment No. 18:  The Right of 
Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from 
Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He Is the Author (Art. 15(1)(c)) 
(Nov. 15, 2004).  The Committee removed this provision from the final draft, perhaps 
because of the uncertain legality of such eligibility requirements under TRIPS.  See 
Nuño Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources and 
Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without Infringing the TRIPS Agreement:  
The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 371, 386-89 (2000). 
 108 Scholars have recently emphasized the importance of nonbinding norms, or soft 
law, as a method to promote international cooperation.  See C.M. Chinkin, The 
Challenge of Soft Law:  Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 850, 856-59 (1989) (discussing different ways in which soft law evolves into 
customary international law).  See generally COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE:  THE ROLE 
OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 
2000); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000). 
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patent eligibility rules when governments submit reports on the steps 
they have taken, and the difficulties they have encountered, to 
implement article 15.109  The recommendations also provide a 
template for countries whose governments already oppose expansive 
intellectual property protection standards to implement more human 
rights-friendly standards in their national laws.110  And they may 
influence the jurisprudence of WTO dispute settlement panels, which 
are likely to confront arguments that TRIPS should be interpreted in a 
manner that avoids conflicts with nonbinding norms and harmonizes 
the objectives of the international intellectual property and 
international human rights regimes.111  These changes are likely to 
evolve incrementally over the course of years. 
A more immediate response to the Committee’s analysis and 
recommendations, however, may occur in other intergovernmental 
negotiating fora.  In the General Comment’s concluding section, the 
Committee attempts to expand its influence and create a broader 
audience for its ideas.  In discussing the obligations of actors other 
than states parties, the Committee declares that “as members of 
international organizations such as WIPO, UNESCO, FAO, WHO, and 
WTO, states parties have an obligation to take whatever measures they 
can to ensure that the policies and decisions of those organizations are 
in conformity with their obligations under the Covenant.”112  It also 
calls on these organizations, as independent actors, “to intensify their 
efforts to take into account human rights principles and obligations in 
their work concerning” authors’ rights.113 
These entreaties are overt attempts to expand the Committee’s 
distinctive human rights framework for intellectual property to other 
international venues where intellectual property treaty-making and 
standard-setting is underway.  The next part of this Article explores  
 
 
 109 ICESCR, supra note 7, arts. 16-17 (setting forth reporting obligations of states 
parties to ICESCR). 
 110 These countries may include developing countries who have proposed a new 
“Development Agenda” at WIPO.  See WIPO General Assembly, Document Prepared by 
the Secretariat, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development 
Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Proposal by Argentina 
and Brazil], available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/ 
wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.pdf.  For a more detailed discussion of the WIPO 
Development Agenda, see infra Part IV.C. 
 111 For a prediction of how WTO dispute settlement jurists are likely to address 
these arguments, see Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 2, at 77-79. 
 112 General Comment No. 17, supra note 61, ¶ 56. 
 113 Id. ¶ 57. 
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these developments, taking up specific lawmaking initiatives under 
way or recently completed in UNESCO, the WHO, and WIPO. 
IV. RECENT TREATY-MAKING IN OTHER INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS RELEVANT TO A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
In the last two years, intellectual property issues have risen to the 
top of the agendas of several international organizations.  Work in 
these venues involves not only the creation of new nonbinding norms 
but, more compellingly, new international agreements.  The 
approaches to intellectual property contained in these treaties, both 
those that have recently been adopted and those still in draft form, are 
closely aligned with the human rights framework for intellectual 
property reflected in the CESCR Committee’s recent interpretive 
statements.  Several of these agreements expressly draw support from 
human rights law.  In addition, they all include provisions that are 
skeptical of expansive intellectual property protection standards and 
appear to conflict with the obligations in TRIPS, TRIPS-plus treaties, 
and other intellectual property agreements. 
A. UNESCO:  The Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
On October 20, 2005, UNESCO adopted a new international 
agreement, the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions (“Cultural Diversity 
Convention”).114  The Convention, which is a product of two years of 
intensive negotiations by government officials and meetings of 
independent experts, builds upon the Universal Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity which UNESCO’s members unanimously adopted 
in 2001.115  The Convention’s birth was significantly more contentious 
than that of its nonbinding parent, however.  The United States in 
 
 114 See U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Oct. 20, 2005 
[hereinafter Cultural Diversity Convention], available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf.  For a brief overview of 
the Convention’s drafting history and its associated documents, see UNESCO, 
Convention on the Prot. and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression, 
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=11281&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC& 
URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2007). 
 115 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO Res. 25, UNESCO, 31st 
Gen. Conference, UNESCO Doc. 31C/Res.25 (Nov. 2, 2001), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf. 
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particular expressed vociferous opposition.116  Fighting a losing battle 
to amend the draft treaty during the final rounds of negotiations, the 
head of the U.S. delegation branded the final document as “deeply 
flawed and fundamentally incompatible with [UNESCO’s] obligation 
to promote the free flow of ideas,” and voted (with Israel) to oppose 
its adoption by 148 other nations.117 
The Cultural Diversity Convention responds to the belief shared by 
many governments that the increasingly fluid movement of cultural 
goods and services across national borders is endangering cultural 
diversity and domestic cultural industries.  A coalition of mainly 
Francophone industrialized and developing countries promoted the 
new treaty as a way to combat this threat and preserve their distinctive 
national cultures.118  Asserting that cultural diversity is a “common 
heritage of humanity,”119 the Convention reaffirms states’ “sovereign 
right to formulate and implement their cultural policies and to adopt 
measures to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions” 
within its territory.120  A series of “guiding principles” informs how 
states are to achieve this objective.  These principles include refraining 
 
 116 See UNESCO Overwhelmingly Approves Cultural Diversity Treaty, BRIDGES WKLY. 
TRADE NEWS DIG. (Geneva, Switz.), Oct. 26, 2005, at 6, 7 (describing “all-out 
diplomatic offensive by Washington to modify the accord or delay its approval, 
including a letter from US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warning governments 
that the accord would ‘sow conflict rather than cooperation’”). 
 117 See Julio Godoy, UNESCO Adopts Convention to Protect Diversity, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 20, 2005, http://www.ipsnews.net/ 
news.asp?idnews=30714.  The final vote on the treaty’s adoption was 148 votes in 
favor, 2 against, and 4 abstentions (Australia, Honduras, Liberia, and Nicaragua).  See 
Press Release, Bureau of Public Information, General Conference Adopts Convention 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (Oct. 20, 
2005), available at http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID= 
29078&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html; Lawrence J. Speer, 
UNESCO Culture Convention Approved, Despite Objections from United States, 22 WTO 
Rep. (BNA) (Oct. 21, 2005). 
 118 The countries in the coalition were Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Mexico, 
Monaco, Morocco, and Senegal.  They were supported by the Francophone member 
states of UNESCO.  See Jan Wouters & Bart De Meester, UNESCO’s Convention on 
Cultural Diversity and WTO Law:  Complementary or Contradictory? 3 n.6 (Institute for 
Int’l Law, Working Paper No. 73, 2005), available at 
http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP73e.pdf. 
 119 Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 114, pmbl., ¶ 2. 
 120 Id. art. 5(1).  This sovereign right must be exercised “in conformity with the 
Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and universally 
recognized human rights instruments.”  Id.; see also Wouters & Meester, supra note 
118, at 8 (“[T]he Convention puts forward only one main right:  the State’s right to 
adopt measures aimed at protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural 
expressions within its territory.”). 
  
2007] Toward a Human Rights Framework 1003 
from actions that “hinder respect for human rights,” such as “freedom 
of expression, information and communication,” and a “principle of 
openness and balance,” which seeks an accommodation between 
protecting local culture and “promot[ing], in an appropriate manner, 
openness to other cultures of the world.”121 
A major point of contention among the treaty’s drafters was how to 
define “cultural expressions,” “cultural industries,” and “cultural 
activities, goods and services,”122 given the overlap among these terms 
and free trade and intellectual property agreements.  Ultimately, the 
drafters adopted capacious definitions of these phrases,123 creating 
significant conflicts with several WTO agreements.  In particular, the 
Cultural Diversity Convention authorizes its member states to give 
preferential treatment to the production, distribution, dissemination, 
and consumption of domestic cultural industries,124 a preference that 
is inconsistent with the national treatment rules in GATT, GATS, and 
TRIPS.125  According to some commentators these provisions are also 
 
 121 Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 114, arts. 2(1), (8). 
 122 Id. art. 4 (defining each of these terms). 
 123 See id. art. 4(3) (defining “cultural expressions” as “those expressions that 
result from the creativity of individuals, groups and societies, and that have cultural 
content”); id. art. 4(4) (defining “cultural activities, goods and services” as including 
“those activities, goods and services, which at the time they are considered as a 
specific attribute, use or purpose, embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective 
of the commercial value they may have”); id. art. 4(5) (defining “cultural industries” 
as “industries producing and distributing cultural goods or services as defined in 
paragraph 4 above”). 
 124 The “measures” that states “may” adopt to protect and promote the diversity of 
cultural expressions within their respective territories include, most notably, the 
following: 
[M]easures that, in an appropriate manner, provide opportunities for 
domestic cultural activities, goods and services among all those available 
within the national territory for their creation, production, dissemination, 
distribution and enjoyment of such domestic cultural activities, goods and 
services, including provisions relating to the language used for such 
activities, goods and services; [and] measures aimed at providing domestic 
independent cultural industries and activities in the informal sector effective 
access to the means of production, dissemination and distribution of cultural 
activities, goods and services. 
Id. arts. 6(2)(b), 6(2)(c). 
 125 See Wouters & Meester, supra note 118, at 18 (identifying numerous 
inconsistencies between WTO agreements and earlier version of Cultural Diversity 
Convention, including provisions that appear in final text, and stating that “measures 
that reserve certain space for domestic cultural goods . . . are a clear violation of the 
principle of national treatment”); see also Lawrence J. Speer, U.S. Totally Isolated at 
UNESCO Meeting as Cultural Diversity Treaty Gets Approved, 22 WTO Rep. (BNA) 
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intended to slow the United States’ effort to negotiate bilateral trade 
treaties that require developing countries to “give up their rights to 
preserve and support their own unique audiovisual and information 
services, including film, television and music.”126 
Although early commentary on the new treaty has stressed its clash 
with international trade rules, the Cultural Diversity Convention’s 
relationship to intellectual property protection standards has an even 
more troubled history.  One might reasonably expect a treaty on 
cultural diversity to contain an extensive treatment of these standards.  
Remarkably, the Convention’s final text contains only a single express 
reference on intellectual property — a statement of “the importance of 
intellectual property rights in sustaining those involved in cultural 
creativity” — which is buried near the end of a twenty-one paragraph 
preamble.127  In addition, the treaty contains three citations to the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights or to “universally recognized 
human rights instruments.”128  These references highlight the 
importance of certain rights protected by those documents, such as 
“freedom of expression, information and communication,” and 
“freedom of thought.”129  Yet they make no mention of the documents’ 
authors’ rights provisions. 
The Cultural Diversity Convention’s sparse references to intellectual 
property are a profound departure from earlier versions of the treaty, 
most notably a March 2005 “composite text” produced by a group of 
intergovernmental experts charged with writing a preliminary draft of 
the Convention.130  The preamble set the tone of the composite text, 
 
(Oct. 20, 2005) (quoting statement by U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO that “[u]nder the 
provisions of the convention as drafted, any state, in the name of cultural diversity, 
might invoke the ambiguous provisions of this convention to try to assert a right to 
erect trade barriers to goods or services that are deemed to be cultural expressions”). 
 126 Godoy, supra note 117. 
 127 Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 114, pmbl., ¶ 17.  This single 
reference is especially surprising given that the Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity advocates the “the full implementation of cultural rights as defined in Article 
27 of the [UDHR] and in Articles 13 and 15 of the [ICESCR].”  Universal Declaration 
on Cultural Diversity, supra note 115, art. 5. 
 128 Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 114, pmbl., ¶ 5, arts. 2(1),  5(1). 
 129 Id. at pmbl., ¶ 12, art. 2(1). 
 130 U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], Preliminary 
Report of the Director-General Containing Two Preliminary Drafts of a Convention on the 
Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions, U.N. Doc. 
CLT/CPD/2005/CONF.203/6, App. 1 (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter March 2005 
Composite Text].  Intellectual property rights are also emphasized in a July 2004 draft 
of the Convention: 
States Parties shall also ensure: 
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emphasizing “the vital role of the creative act . . . and hence the vital 
role of artists and other creators, whose work needs to be endowed 
with appropriate intellectual property rights.”131  This was followed, in 
the draft treaty’s definitions section, with a list of the characteristics of 
“cultural goods and services,” which recognized that such goods and 
services “generate, or may generate, intellectual property, whether or 
not they are protected under existing intellectual property 
legislation.”132  The composite text also included, in unequivocal and 
forceful language, an affirmative obligation to protect intellectual 
property.  This obligation extended to intellectual property rights 
recognized in “existing international instruments to which States are 
parties”133 as well as “traditional . . . cultural contents and 
expressions,”134 with a particular focus on preventing piracy, 
misappropriation, and “the granting of invalid intellectual property 
rights.”135 
Finally, in recognition of the need to harmonize the draft treaty with 
preexisting treaties, the composite text included two “savings clauses” 
that specified which treaty obligations were to take precedence in the 
event of a conflict between agreements.136  The first clause specified 
that the provisions of the draft Cultural Diversity Convention were 
 
(a) that the legal and social status of artists and creators is fully recognized, 
in conformity with international existing instruments, so that their central 
role in nurturing the diversity of cultural expressions is enhanced; 
(b) that intellectual property rights are fully respected and enforced 
according to existing international instruments, particularly through the 
development or strengthening of measures against piracy. 
U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], Preliminary Draft 
of a Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic 
Expressions, art. 7(2), U.N. Doc. CLT/CPD/2004/CONF-201/2 (July 2004). 
 131 March 2005 Composite Text, supra note 130, pmbl., ¶ 10. 
 132 Id. art. 4(3). 
 133 Id. art. 7(3) (“[States Parties] shall ensure [intellectual property rights] are 
[fully respected and enforced] according to existing international instruments to 
which States are parties, particularly through the development [or strengthening] of 
measures against piracy.”) (internal citations omitted) (brackets in original). 
 134 Id. art. 7(4) (“[States Parties] undertake to ensure in their territory [protection 
against unwarranted appropriation] of traditional and popular [cultural contents and 
expressions], [with particular regard to preventing the granting of invalid intellectual 
property rights].”) (internal citations omitted) (brackets in original). 
 135 Id. 
 136 For a discussion of savings clauses between trade and environmental protection 
agreements, see Sabrina Saffrin, Treaties in Collision?  The Biosafety Protocol and the 
World Trade Organization Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 606, 614-18 (2002). 
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subordinate to “any existing international instrument relating to 
intellectual property rights” to which the Convention’s member states 
were also parties.137  The second paragraph carved out a narrow 
exception to this hierarchy, however, recognizing that “[t]he 
provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and 
obligations of any State Party deriving from any existing international 
instrument, except where the exercise of those rights and obligations 
would cause serious damage or threat to the diversity of cultural 
expressions.”138  Inspired by a similar provision in the Convention on 
Biological Diversity which has yet to be authoritatively interpreted, 
this savings clause would have subordinated trade and intellectual 
property obligations to those of the Cultural Diversity Convention in 
the event that a member state could demonstrate such damage.139 
In comparison to the March 2005 composite text, the final 
Convention manifests near antipathy to intellectual property 
protection standards.  The drafters removed all of the clauses 
described above and replaced them with far weaker commitments.140  
When protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions, 
member states now “may” adopt “measures aimed at nurturing and 
supporting artists and others involved in the creation of cultural 
expressions.”141  And they need only “endeavour to recognize the 
important contribution of artists, others involved in the creative 
process, cultural communities, and organizations that support their 
work, and their central role in nurturing the diversity of cultural 
expressions.”142  By contrast, states may also achieve the Cultural 
Diversity Convention’s goals by “promot[ing] the free exchange and 
circulation of . . . cultural expressions and cultural activities, goods 
 
 137 March 2005 Composite Text, supra note 130, art. 19, Option A, ¶ 1. 
 138 Id. art. 19, Option A, ¶ 2. 
 139 U.N. Environment Programme [UNEP], Convention on Biological Diversity art. 
22.1, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div./N7-INC5/4, 31 I.L.M. 818 (“The 
provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any 
Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, except where 
the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to 
biological diversity.”); see also Wouters & Meester, supra note 118, at 29 (analyzing 
savings clauses in March 2005 composite text). 
 140 The removal of these clauses appears to have occurred in early April 2005 at a 
meeting of UNESCO officials and government negotiators held in Cape Town, South 
Africa.  See The Director General, UNESCO, Report of the Director-General on the 
Progress Achieved During the Third Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts 
on the Preliminary Draft Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural 
Contents and Artistic Expressions, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. 172 EX/20 (Aug. 11, 2005). 
 141 Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 114, art. 6(2)(g). 
 142 Id. art. 7(2). 
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and services”143 — a provision that could be read as sanctioning 
promotional efforts that disregard intellectual property protection 
rules required by TRIPS and other international agreements. 
Finally, the savings clause contained in the Convention differs 
substantially from the earlier draft described above.  In place of 
hierarchical rules, the clause adopts a posture of studied ambiguity.  
On the one hand, it stresses the need to “foster mutual supportiveness 
between th[e] Convention and other treaties” and specifies that none 
of its provisions “shall be interpreted as modifying rights and 
obligations of the Parties under any other treaties to which they are 
parties.”144  But the savings clause also emphasizes that the Cultural 
Diversity Convention is not “subordinat[e] . . . to any other treaty.”145  
And it directs member states to take into account the Convention’s 
provisions when “interpreting and applying the other treaties to which 
they are parties or when entering into other international 
obligations.”146  How states will reconcile these clauses, and whether 
they will enable states to protect cultural diversity in ways that violate 
trade and intellectual property agreements, cannot be determined until 
after the Convention enters into force following its thirtieth 
ratification.147 
B. WHO:  The Medical Research and Development Treaty 
In February 2005, a coalition of more than 150 NGOs, public heath 
experts, economists, and legal scholars called on the WHO to consider 
a proposal for a Medical Research and Development Treaty 
(“MRDT”).148  The treaty aims to establish a new legal framework to 
promote research and development for pharmaceuticals and other 
medical treatments that functions as an alternative to patents and the 
monopoly drug pricing they engender.  The treaty’s proponents argue 
that expansive intellectual property protection rules have created 
numerous problems, including restricting access to essential 
medicines, costly and wasteful marketing of drugs and medical 
products, and skewing investment away from innovations needed to 
 
 143 Id. art. 6(2)(e).  This clause also appeared in earlier drafts of the Convention.  
See March 2005 Composite Text, supra note 130, art. 6(2)(d). 
 144 Cultural Diversity Convention, supra note 114, arts. 20(1)(a), 20(2). 
 145 Id. art. 20(1). 
 146 Id. arts. 20(1), 20(1)(b). 
 147 Id. art. 29 (specifying procedures for Convention’s entry into force). 
 148 Medical Research and Development Treaty (draft Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter 
MRDT], available a http://www.cptech.org/workingdrafts/rndtreaty4.pdf. 
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treat diseases that afflict individuals throughout the developing 
world.149 
The core objectives of the MRDT include encouraging investments 
in medical innovation responsive to the greatest global need, fairly 
allocating the costs of such innovation among governments, and 
sharing the benefits of medical innovation, including new drugs and 
medical technologies, with developing countries.150  The treaty 
achieves these goals by setting minimum financial obligations for 
qualifying research and development based upon each nation’s gross 
domestic product.  Member states can meet those obligations by 
funding qualifying research projects within their own borders.  But 
they can also fund eligible research in other countries through a 
system of tradable credits that resembles the emissions trading 
mechanism created for environmental agreements such as the Kyoto 
Protocol.151  According to the treaty’s proponents, the result of these 
provisions will be a new legal paradigm that “provide[s] the flexibility 
to reconcile different policy objectives, including the promotion of 
both innovation and access, consistent with human rights and the 
promotion of science in the public interest.”152 
The MRDT’s intellectual property provisions are both novel and 
controversial.  The treaty requires all member states to adopt 
“minimum exceptions to patents rights for research purposes” within 
five years of ratification.153  (The current draft does not specify the 
content of these exceptions, however.)  It also includes a commitment 
to forego patent applications for a yet-to-be-specified period of time 
for inventions based upon data from certain open or “public goods 
databases.”154  In the area of copyright, related rights, and databases, 
the treaty envisions the adoption of “a best practices model for 
 
 149 See Letter to Ask World Health Organization to Evaluate New Treaty 
Framework for Medical Research and Development (Feb. 24, 2005) [hereinafter NGO 
Letter to WHO], available at http://www.cptech.org/workingdrafts/ 
rndsignonletter.html; see also Nicoletta Dentico & Nathan Ford, The Courage to 
Change the Rules:  A Proposal for an Essential Health R & D Treaty, 2 PUB. LIB. SCI. MED. 
96, 97-98 (2005). 
 150 See Andrew Jack, WHO Members Urged to Sign Kyoto-Style Treaty, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Feb. 24, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 2823253; Posting by William New, 
Medical R & D Treaty Debated at World Health Assembly, to Intellectual Property 
Watch, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=60 (May 30, 2005, 2:01 P.M.). 
 151 Jack, supra note 150; New, supra note 150. 
 152 NGO Letter to WHO, supra note 149, at 1. 
 153 MRDT, supra note 148, art. 14.2. 
 154 Id. art. 14.1 
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exceptions” in national laws.155  It does not explain, however, how 
these exceptions further the treaty’s medical research goals. 
To protect the MRDT’s distinctive alternative framework for medical 
research and innovation, including its intellectual property provisions, 
the MRDT’s proponents needed to specify the treaty’s relationship to 
other international agreements.  The drafters adopted a distinctive 
approach to this important legal issue.  Unlike other recently adopted 
treaties whose provisions plausibly conflict with preexisting trade or 
intellectual property agreements, the MRDT does not contain a clause 
specifying its relationship to those agreements.  Rather, with respect to 
a defined class of medical research and development products,156 the 
MRDT’s signatories agree “to forgo dispute resolution cases” that 
concern (1) the TRIPS provisions protecting patents and undisclosed 
test data, or (2) the “pricing of medicines.”157  They also agree to forgo 
such dispute settlement, as well as sanctions, “in regional or bilateral 
trade agreements or unilateral trade policies.”158  This forbearance is 
not absolute, however.  Rather, it applies only “in areas where 
compliance with the terms of the Treaty provides an alternative and 
superior framework for supporting innovation.”159 
The MRDT’s future remains uncertain.  A meeting of experts 
attending the World Health Assembly in May 2005 debated the treaty’s 
provisions and underlying philosophy, and advocates at that meeting 
have proposed that the Assembly establish a committee of member 
states to consider the draft treaty sometime in 2006.160 
C. WIPO:  The Development Agenda and Access to Knowledge Treaty 
Since its creation in the late 1960s, the WIPO has engaged in a 
broad array of activities consistent with its mandate of “promot[ing] 
 
 155 Id. art. 15. 
 156 The products defined as “qualified medical research and development” include:  
“i. Basic biomedical research; ii. Development of biomedical databases and research 
tools; iii. Development of pharmaceutical drugs, vaccines, medical diagnostic tools; iv. 
Medical evaluations of these products; and v. the preservation and dissemination of 
traditional medical knowledge.”  Id. art. 4.1. 
 157 Id. art. 16(d). 
 158 Id. arts. 16(d), 2.3. 
 159 Id. art. 2.3. 
 160 See New, supra note 150; Tim Hubbard, Reply to the Comments Requested by 
CIPIH and WHO to the CPTech Proposal for a Medical Research and Development 
Treaty (MRDT) (Aug. 15, 2005), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/ 
submissions/SubmissionsHubbard.pdf. 
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the protection of intellectual property throughout the world.”161  To 
assist member states in negotiating international agreements, the 
WIPO Secretariat hosts periodic diplomatic conferences, shares 
information, and provides expert advice.  WIPO also provides 
technical assistance and training to national governments and to their 
intellectual property offices, especially in developing countries.  More 
recently, the organization has created standing, expert, and 
intergovernmental committees which examine specific intellectual 
property topics and create nonbinding guidelines and 
recommendations (so-called “soft law”).162 
Over the last decade, WIPO and its member states have been 
exceptionally active in negotiating new intellectual property treaties 
relating to copyrights, patents, and trademarks and in undertaking an 
ambitious program of soft lawmaking.  Although these activities have 
generated new intellectual property protection standards, those 
standards have not exclusively favored the interests of industrialized 
countries.  Although some initiatives have benefited states with well-
resourced and influential intellectual property industries, developing 
countries have retained considerable influence in the organization to 
shape treaty obligations and soft law norms.163 
Two years ago, however, the political winds shifted in favor of 
governments and civil society groups seeking to refocus WIPO’s 
mandate away from generating new intellectual property protection 
standards and toward economic development and non-proprietary 
approaches to promoting human innovation and creativity.  In 
October 2004, the WIPO General Assembly adopted a proposal from 
Argentina and Brazil to establish a new Development Agenda for the 
organization.164  This proposal reflected collaboration among like-
minded developing countries (known as the “Friends of 
Development”)165 and civil society groups, the latter of which issued 
 
 161 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] 
art. 3(i), July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (as amended Sept. 28, 1979). 
 162 See Edward Kwakwa, Some Comments on Rulemaking at the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 192 (2002) (discussing 
resolutions and recommendations that comprise “the new ‘soft law initiative’ at 
WIPO”). 
 163 For a more detailed discussion of these trends, see Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra 
note 2, at 25-26. 
 164 See World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], General Assembly, Report of the 
Twenty-First (15th Extraordinary) Session, ¶ 218, WO/GA/31/15 (Oct. 5, 2004), 
available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/wipo10042004.html; WIPO, Proposal by 
Argentina and Brazil, supra note 110. 
 165 The Friends of Development are comprised of the following countries:  
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the “Geneva Declaration on the Future of WIPO” prior to the General 
Assembly meeting.166 
The Geneva Declaration was a brilliant example of using core 
institutional principles to foment institutional reform.  Although the 
convention establishing WIPO speaks of promoting intellectual 
property protection on a global basis, there is authority for 
interpreting the organization’s mandate much more capaciously.  In 
1974 WIPO entered into an agreement designating it as a specialized 
agency of the United Nations.167  Adopted during a period when 
pressure by newly independent developing countries for a New 
International Economic Order was at its zenith,168 the agreement states 
that WIPO is responsible for “promoting creative intellectual activity 
and facilitating the transfer of technology . . . to developing countries 
in order to accelerate economic, social and cultural development.”169 
The Geneva Declaration’s drafters seized upon this long-forgotten 
treaty language to articulate a revised mission for WIPO.  Proceeding 
from the premise that “[h]umanity faces a global crisis in the 
governance of knowledge, technology and culture,”170 the Geneva 
Declaration demands that WIPO eschew additional expansions of 
monopoly privileges.171  Instead, it urges the organization to devote 
greater attention to issues such as (1) the social and economic costs of 
 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, 
Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, and Venezuela.  See WIPO, Inter-Sessional 
Intergovernmental Meeting on a Development Agenda for WIPO, 1st Sess., Proposal to 
Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO:  An Elaboration of Issues Raised in Document 
WO/GA/31/11, Annex at 2, IIM/1/4 (Apr. 6, 2005). 
 166 Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Geneva Declaration], available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf. 
 167 Agreement Between the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization art. 1, Dec. 17, 1974, [hereinafter UN-WIPO Agreement], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/agreement/pdf/un_wipo_agreement.pdf. 
 168 As Peter Yu has stated, “The New International Economic Order sought to bring 
about fundamental changes in the international economic system by redistributing 
power, wealth, and resources from the developed North to the less developed South.”  
Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 409 n.392 (2004) (citing Declaration on the Establishment of 
a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, at 527, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special 
Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974)). 
 169 UN-WIPO Agreement, supra note 167, art. 1. 
 170 Geneva Declaration, supra note 166, at 1. 
 171 Id. at 2 (“‘A one size fits all’ approach that embraces the highest levels of 
intellectual property protection for everyone leads to unjust and burdensome 
outcomes for countries that are struggling to meet the most basic needs of their 
citizens.”). 
  
1012 University of California, Davis [Vol. 40:971 
intellectual property protection, (2) reforms of existing intellectual 
property rules, and (3) non-proprietary systems of creativity and 
innovation, such as “Wikipedia, the Creative Commons, GNU Linux 
and other free and open software projects, as well as distance 
education tools and medical research tools.”172 
Among the many items on the Development Agenda is a proposal 
for a Treaty on Access to Knowledge (colloquially referred to as the 
“A2K Treaty”).173  Although the A2K Treaty has recently received the 
backing of influential developing countries such as Brazil and India, its 
origins are firmly rooted in civil society.  In fact, the treaty’s genesis 
resembles the decentralized, open source collaboration models that its 
text endorses.  A diverse group of NGOs, whose members include 
medical researchers, educators, archivists, disabled people, and 
librarians from industrialized and developing nations, drafted and 
circulated numerous suggestions for provisions to be included in the 
treaty.174  In February 2005, representatives of these groups met in 
Geneva to discuss the proposals and to hammer out a comprehensive 
text.175 
The current draft of the A2K Treaty bears the telltale fingerprints of 
multiple authors with diverse (if not divergent) interests.  It includes a 
dozen articles on limitations and exceptions to copyright and related 
rights, provisions on patent protection aimed at “expanding and 
enhancing the knowledge commons,” measures to promote open 
standards and control anticompetitive practices, and a hodge podge of  
 
 
 172 Id. at 1.  For more detailed discussions of the objectives of the Development 
Agenda’s proponents, see generally Humanizing Intellectual Property:  Developing 
Countries Launch New Initiative, THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE, Nov.-Dec. 2004), available 
at http://www.twnside.org.sg/focus.htm (describing different components of 
Development Agenda); James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual 
Property, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, available at www.law.duke.edu/journals/ 
dltr/articles/2004dltr0009.html (arguing that WIPO must reverse “maximalist rights 
culture” that international intellectual property regime currently embodies and that is 
detrimental to global development). 
 173 Treaty on Access to Knowledge (May 9, 2005) (draft) [hereinafter A2K Treaty], 
available at http://www.cptech.org/a2k/consolidatedtext-may9.pdf. 
 174 For a list of supporting civil society organizations, see IP Justice, NGO Group 
Statement Supporting the Friends of Development Proposal, 
http://www.ipjustice.org/WIPO/NGO_Statement.shtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).  
Proposals for inclusion in the A2K Treaty circulated through an “A2K” listerv.  
CPTech.org, A2K Listserv, http://lists.essential.org/mailman/listinfo/a2k. 
 175 See Posting of William New, Experts Debate Access to Knowledge, to Intellectual 
Property Watch, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=19&res= 
1024&print=0 (Feb. 15, 2005, 10:24 P.M.). 
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miscellaneous and unfinished clauses on technology transfer, 
copyright collecting societies, and financial obligations.176 
Several common threads connect these varied provisions.  First, 
according to observers at the Geneva meeting, the treaty’s proponents 
strongly support the view that “access to knowledge is a basic human 
right, and that restrictions on access ought to be the exception, not the 
other way around.”177  Although the draft text does not expressly 
mention human rights nor cite to the ICESCR or the UDHR, many of 
its provisions echo the human rights framework for intellectual 
property described in this Article.  For example, the treaty’s preamble 
highlights the need for a balanced regime of protection, emphasizing 
both the importance of “protecting and supporting the interests of 
creative individuals and communities” and “enhanc[ing] participation 
in cultural, civic and educational affairs, and sharing of the benefits of 
scientific advancement.”178   
A second thematic link among the A2K Treaty’s diverse clauses is 
that both subject matter exclusions from, and exceptions and 
limitations to, intellectual property protection standards are 
mandatory rather than permissive.  In the area of inventions, for 
example, the treaty contains a lengthy list of exclusions from 
patentable subject matter, including, most controversially, computer 
programs and business methods.179  With respect to copyright, the 
treaty states that “[f]acts and works lacking in creativity, should not 
be subject to copyright or copyrightlike protections,”180 a rule that 
appears to preclude sui generis protection for unoriginal databases.  It 
also contains a lengthy list of exceptions and limitations, which (in the 
case of copyrighted works) are presumed to satisfy the “three-step 
test” for such restrictions set out in TRIPS.181 
The A2K Treaty’s subject matter exclusions and its exceptions and 
limitations parallel similar provisions found in some — but by no 
means all — national laws.  For states that ratify the A2K Treaty, 
however, these exceptions will become compulsory.  The treaty thus 
 
 176 A2K Treaty, supra note 173, at 1-2 (listing various treaty provisions). 
 177 New, supra note 175. 
 178 A2K Treaty, supra note 173, pmbl., paras. 1, 4. 
 179 Id. art. 4.1(c) (stating that “patent rights shall not be granted for, inter alia, 
“programs for computers,” “presentations of information,” and “methods of teaching 
and education”). 
 180 Id. art. 3.7. 
 181 Id. art. 3.1(a); see Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 17-19 (discussing three-step test 
for TRIPS-compatibility of exceptions and limitations to copyright and patent 
protection). 
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endorses maximum standards of intellectual property protection to 
counterbalance the “minimum standards” approach that intellectual 
property agreements have followed for more than a century.182 
Under this “minimum standards” approach, multilateral intellectual 
property treaties establish a floor of protection.  But nothing in the 
treaties prevents governments from enacting more expansive 
intellectual property rules in their domestic laws or from entering into 
subsequent agreements that achieve the same result.  Indeed, the 
treaties expressly contemplate that governments may gravitate toward 
such higher standards.183  By placing a mandatory ceiling on how high 
these standards can rise, the proponents of the A2K Treaty are 
attempting to counteract the upward drift of intellectual property rules 
that has accelerated over the past few decades and to establish a 
balance regime of protection that is fully consistent with a human 
rights framework for intellectual property. 
CONCLUSION 
The creation of a human rights framework for intellectual property 
is still in an early stage of development.  During this gestational 
period, government officials, international jurists, NGOs, and 
commentators — many of whom have divergent views concerning the 
appropriate relationship between human rights and intellectual 
property — have a window of opportunity to influence the 
framework’s substantive content and the procedural rules that mediate 
relationships among its component parts.  In this conclusion, I briefly 
sketch three hypothetical futures for the framework and explain why 
each of these predictions is both plausible and likely to be contested 
by states and non-state actors. 
 
 182 See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 1 (“Members may, but shall not be obliged to, 
implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this 
Agreement.”); see also J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual 
Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L LAW. 
345, 351 (1995). 
 183 See, e.g., Berne Convention supra note 17, art. 19 (“The provisions of this 
Convention shall not preclude the making of a claim to the benefit of any greater 
protection which may be granted by legislation in a country of the Union.”); Paris 
Convention, supra note 16, art. 19 (“It is understood that the countries of the Union 
reserve the right to make separately between themselves special agreements for the 
protection of industrial property, in so far as these agreements do not contravene the 
provisions of this Convention.”). 
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A. Using Human Rights to Expand Intellectual Property 
One possible future relationship between human rights and 
intellectual property is an expansion of intellectual property 
protection standards at the expense of other human rights and the 
interests of licensees, users, and consumers.  In this vision of the 
future (a dystopian one, to be sure), industries and interest groups 
that rely upon intellectual property for their economic well-being 
would invoke the authors’ rights and property rights provisions in 
human rights treaties to further augment existing standards of 
protection.  The fear of such expansions helps to explain why some 
commentators are skeptical of attempts to analyze intellectual 
property issues in human rights terms.184 
Early intimations of this version of the framework’s future are 
already apparent.  The authors’ rights clauses of the UDHR and 
ICESCR share a close affinity with the natural rights tradition of droit 
d’auteur prominent in civil law jurisdictions.185  Constitutional courts 
in several European countries have recently relied on fundamental 
rights guarantees in their respective domestic constitutions to justify 
intellectual property protection.186  It would be but a short step for 
these courts to turn to international human rights law to enhance this 
protection still further.187 
Whether these expansionist tendencies take root or not may depend 
upon the outcome of a dispute pending before the European Court of 
Human Rights (“ECHR”), the international tribunal charged with 
adjudicating complaints under the European Convention on Human 
 
 184 See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2853 (2006); Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International 
Intellectual Property Law, 40 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1031-32 (2007). 
 185 See STROWEL, supra note 62, at 290-321. 
 186 See, e.g., Joseph Straus, Design Protection for Spare Parts Gone in Europe?  
Proposed Changes to the EC Directive:  The Commission’s Mandate and Its Doubtful 
Extension, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. Rev. 391, 298 (2005) (discussing 2000 decision of 
German Constitutional Court which held that patents constitute property under 
article 14 of German Basic Law); Thomas Crampton, Apple Gets French Support in 
Music Compatibility Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at C7 (discussing ruling of French 
Constitutional Council, country’s highest judicial body, which “declared major 
aspects of the so-called iPod law unconstitutional”; court’s decision “made frequent 
reference to the 1789 Declaration on Human Rights and concluded that the law 
violated the constitutional protections of property”). 
 187 For an insightful discussion of these issues, see Christophe Geiger, 
“Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law?  The Influence of Fundamental Rights on 
Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 371, 
382-85 (2006). 
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Rights (“European Convention”) and its Protocols.188  In Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, a decision issued in late 2005,189 the ECHR 
concluded that registered trademarks are protected by the property 
rights clause of the European Convention’s first Protocol.190  Using 
forceful and unequivocal language, the ECHR stated that “intellectual 
property as such incontestably enjoys the protection of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1.”191  On the facts presented, however, a majority of the 
ECHR found no violation of the right to property because the 
American brewer’s trademark application was contested by a rival 
Czech beer distributor whose products were protected by a registered 
geographical indication.192  Given the importance of these issues, the 
ECHR referred the case to a Grand Chamber for re-argument in 
2006.193  The Grand Chamber held that the right to property includes 
intellectual property as well as applications to register trademarks.  On 
the unique facts presented, however, it concluded that the government 
had not violated article 1.194  The Grand Chamber thus left unresolved  
 
 
 188 See generally European Court of Human Rights, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2007). 
 189 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 10, 
2005), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action= 
html&documentId=787908&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=113
2746FF1FE2A468ACCBCD1763D4D8149. 
 190 See id. paras. 43-49; see also Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, 
213 U.N.T.S. 262, 262 [hereinafter Article 1] (“Every natural or legal person is 
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.”). 
 191 Anheuser-Busch, App. No. 73049/01, para. 43. 
 192 Id. paras. 50-52. 
 193 Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber 
Hearing Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal (June 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.coe.int/T/D/Kommunikation_und_politische_Forschung/Presse_und_Onli
ne_Info/Presseinfos/2006/20060628-381-GH-Portugal.asp.  Review by this panel of 17 
judges is reserved for disputes which involve “a serious question affecting the 
interpretation or application of the Convention or the protocols thereto, or a serious 
issue of general importance.”  Id. 
 194 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, ¶¶ 72, 79-87 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Grand Chamber Jan. 11, 2007), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/ 
viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&ke
y=60433&sessionId=11419720&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.  Article 1 
expressly authorizes governments to regulate private property in the public interest.  
Article 1, supra note 190, at 262 (“The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any 
way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control 
the use of property in accordance with the general interest . . . .”).  It does not, 
however, specify how the ECHR is to assess the legality of such regulations. 
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the more difficult issue of when governments may regulate or restrict 
intellectual property in the public interest. 
B. Using Human Rights to Impose External Limits on 
Intellectual Property 
Patent, trademark, and copyright owners who invoke the property 
rights and authors’ rights provisions of human rights law to demand 
additional legal protections will likely face stiff resistance from user 
groups.  These groups can draw upon other fundamental rights and 
freedoms to press for a competing version of the framework, one that 
relies on human rights law to restrict intellectual property. 
National courts in Europe are using the right to freedom of 
expression protected by the European Convention for precisely this 
purpose.195  “In particular, there have been a number of decisions in 
the field of copyright in which the freedom of expression has been 
invoked to justify a use that is not covered by an exception provided 
for in the law.”196  These decisions rely on human rights law to 
overcome the “malfunctions” of the intellectual property system, using 
them as a “corrective when [intellectual property] rights are used 
excessively and contrary to their functions.”197  In effect, these cases 
reach beyond intellectual property’s own safety valves — such as fair 
use, fair dealing, and other exceptions and limitations — to impose 
external limits, or maximum standards of protection, upon rights 
holders.198 
How might user groups increase the likelihood that national courts 
will invoke human rights law to constrain intellectual property in this 
way?  One plausible method would be to extend the strategy described 
in Part IV of this Article to other international lawmaking venues.199  
 
 195 See Michael D. Birnhack, Copyrighting Speech:  A Trans-Atlantic View, in 
TORREMANS, supra note 6, at 37, 52-61; Alain Strowel & François Tulkens, Equilibrer 
la liberté d’expression et le droit d’auteur:  A propos des libertés de créer et d’user des 
oeuvres, in DROIT D’AUTEUR ET LIBERTÉ D’EXPRESSION 1 (Alain Strowel & François 
Tulkens eds., 2006). 
 196 Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of 
Intellectual Property Law?, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 268, 277 
(2004). 
 197 Id. at 278. 
 198 See Birnhack, supra note 195, at 61-62; Geiger, supra note 196, at 270-80. 
 199 See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 2, at 58 (describing strategy whereby 
states and non-state actors shifted lawmaking initiatives into biodiversity, plant 
genetic resources, public health, and human rights regimes as way to create 
“counterregime intellectual property norms” in tension with TRIPS). 
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Increasing the number of new treaties and soft law standards that 
contain precise, subject-specific limits on intellectual property 
improves the odds that domestic judges will refer to those limits when 
resolving the disputes that come before them.  Such an approach also 
creates “strategic inconsistency” that increases pressure on 
government representatives in other international organizations to 
acknowledge these new rules and standards.200 
This tactic has considerable risks, however.  The international legal 
system is disaggregated and decentralized and lacks the 
comprehensive normative hierarchies and enforcements mechanisms 
found in national laws.201  A surfeit of conflicting rules will further 
diminish the system’s coherence.  This could make international rules 
less amenable to incorporation into national law, especially for judges 
unsure of their authority to construe domestic statutes in harmony 
with those rules. 
C. Achieving Human Rights Ends Through Intellectual Property Means 
The two future frameworks described above share a common 
strategy.  They each take the existing baseline of intellectual property 
protection as a given and then invoke human rights law to bolster 
arguments for moving that baseline in one direction or the other. 
A third human rights framework for intellectual property proceeds 
from a very different premise.  It first specifies the minimum outcomes 
— in terms of health, poverty, education, and so forth — that human 
rights law requires of states.  The framework next works backwards to 
identify different mechanisms available to states to achieve those 
outcomes.  Intellectual property plays only a secondary role in this 
version of the framework.  Where intellectual property laws help to 
achieve human rights outcomes, governments should embrace it.  
Where it hinders those outcomes, its rules should be modified (but 
not necessarily restricted, as I indicate below).  But the focus remains 
on the minimum levels of human well-being that states must provide, 
using either appropriate intellectual property rules or other means. 
A 2001 report by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
analyzing the impact of TRIPS on the right to health exemplifies this 
 
 200 Kal Raustalia & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic 
Resources, 58 INT’L ORG. 277, 301-02 (2004); see also Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra 
note 2, at 60 (describing efforts by developing countries to integrate “principles, 
norms, and rules generated in other regimes into the WTO and WIPO”). 
 201 See Laurence R. Helfer, Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal System, 
37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 205-06 (2003). 
  
2007] Toward a Human Rights Framework 1019 
outcome-focused, inductive approach.202  The report reviews the 
components of the right to health protected by article 12 of the 
ICESCR.203  According to a general comment issued by the CESCR 
Committee, the right to health includes an obligation for states to 
promote medical research and to provide access to affordable 
treatments, including essential drugs.204 
The High Commissioner’s report analyzes how intellectual property 
affects these two obligations.  It acknowledges that patents help 
governments promote medical research by providing an incentive to 
invent new medical technologies, including new drugs.  But the report 
also asserts that pharmaceutical companies’ “commercial motivation . . 
. means that research is directed, first and foremost, towards 
‘profitable’ disease.  Diseases that predominantly affect people in 
poorer countries . . . remain relatively under-researched.”205  One way 
to remedy this market imperfection is to create incentives for 
innovation outside of the patent system.206 
A similar perspective informs the High Commissioner’s discussion 
of access to essential medicines.  The report states that patent 
protection decreases the affordability of drugs.  But affordability also 
depends on factors unrelated to intellectual property, “such as the 
level of import duties, taxes, and local market approval costs.”207  In 
light of these dual impediments, governments can improve access to 
patented pharmaceuticals in two ways.  First, they can exploit the 
flexibilities already embedded in TRIPS, such as issuing compulsory 
licenses to manufacturer generic drugs and importing cheaper drugs 
from other countries.208  Second, they can adopt affordability-
enhancing mechanisms outside of the intellectual property system, for 
example through differential pricing, “the exchange of price 
information, price competition and price negotiation with public 
procurement and insurance schemes.”209  Strikingly, the efficacy of 
 
 202 High Commissioner Report, supra note 47. 
 203 ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 12. 
 204 High Commissioner Report, supra note 47, ¶ 30. 
 205 Id. ¶ 37. 
 206 See id. ¶¶ 37-38.  One such alternative would be to establish “fixed monetary 
prizes for the first inventor to come up with an effective treatment for a medical 
indication” that was under-researched in the patent system.  Keith E. Maskus, 
Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines:  Some Economic Considerations, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
563, 578 (2002) (reviewing and critiquing such proposals). 
 207 High Commissioner Report, supra note 47, ¶ 43. 
 208 Id. ¶¶ 47-49. 
 209 Id. ¶ 46. 
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these mechanisms may require augmenting existing intellectual 
property protection rules, such as negotiating “drug licensing 
agreements with geographical restrictions[,] . . . so that cheaper drugs 
do not leak back to wealthier markets.”210 
It is too early to predict which of these three versions of the human 
rights framework for intellectual property, or others yet to be 
identified, will emerge as dominant.  What is certain is that the rules, 
institutions, and discourse of international human rights are now 
increasingly relevant to intellectual property law and policy and that 




 210 Id. ¶ 47; see also id. ¶ 50 (emphasizing need for rules to ensure that “trademarks 
are not counterfeited” so that consumers and medical professionals can “identify the 
source and quality of pharmaceuticals”). 
